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Abstract 
Introduction: Unawareness of deficits is a common phenomenon following brain 
injury. The causes of unawareness are commonly attributed either to neurological 
(anosognosia) or psychological (denial) explanations. Anosognosia is the most 
frequently cited explanation for unawareness, although denial represents a plausible 
alternative given the traumatic and life-changing nature of sustaining a brain injury. 
Although denial is often mentioned in the literature, studies rarely conduct direct 
assessments to try and determine its presence. This review focuses on those 
measures which have been used to assess denial following brain injury, evaluating 
their methodological quality, as well as the extent to which they are capable of 
measuring this phenomenon. 
Methods: Search terms were applied to electronic databases, and hand searches 
were conducted of relevant journals between 1990 and February 2010. 
Results: Eight assessment measures were identified which had been used to directly 
assess the presence of denial following brain injury, focussing on participants’ 
beliefs; behavioural observations; and implicit measures of denial and defensiveness. 
Discussion: The methodological quality of assessment measures varied substantially. 
Many of the measures used to assess denial did not report basic psychometric 
properties. None of the studies control for potential confounds in criterion validity 
and conflation of behavioural responses with underlying constructs. There was no 
evidence of convergent validity between separate measures. Implicit measures were 10 
 
viewed as the most psychometrically robust in this specific context. The clinical and 
ethical implications of assessing denial are discussed, along with methodological 
recommendations for future research. 
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Introduction 
 
Unawareness of impairments is a common consequence of acquired brain injury. 
However, there is a central difficulty regarding terminology when exploring the 
literature in this area. The terms ‘unawareness’, ‘denial’ and ‘anosognosia’ are 
frequently used interchangeably. Sometimes the same term is used to describe 
different sorts of concepts and sometimes different terms are used to describe 
similar concepts (Markova & Berrios, 2006). This is further complicated by a lack of 
specificity with regard to the way in which these terms are applied. For example, 
they are often used to describe the presence of a particular behaviour (e.g. denying 
hemiplegia; lacking insight into cognitive deficits), as well as implying the cause of 
this behaviour (e.g. psychological vs. neurological factors). For the purposes of 
clarity, this review will adopt the same nomenclature as Kortte & Wegener (2004): 
‘unawareness’ will be used to describe the presence of limited awareness or insight 
into impairments or into the implications of such impairments. In the context of 
acquired brain injury, ‘denial’ will be used to refer to unawareness presumed to be 
of psychological origin, and ‘anosognosia’ will refer to unawareness presumed to be 
of neurological origin. 
 
Some authors have argued that the presence of unawareness is important because it 
has significant prognostic value in terms of vocational outcomes following acquired 
brain injury (e.g. Sherer, Hart, Todd, Whyte, Thompson et al., 2003). Markova & 
Berrios (2006) conducted a review of methods used to assess the presence and 12 
 
extent of unawareness. They identified three main groups of assessment methods: 
clinician-rated; discrepancy methods; and composite methods. Clinician-rated 
methods rely on clinical judgements to determine the extent to which a patient lacks 
insight, and differences exist in terms of the factors that are examined in different 
studies. Discrepancy methods determine the level of insight according to the 
discrepancy between the patient’s self-reported functioning and that of another 
individual, again focussing on a variety of different factors. Finally, composite 
measures represent a mixed group of methods, including combinations of clinician-
rated and discrepancy methods (e.g. video-feedback and qualitative interviews).  
 
Recent reviews have also explored the causal factors associated with unawareness. 
Orfei, Robinson, Prigatano, Starkstein, Rucsh et al. (2007) reviewed the neural 
correlates associated with anosognosia. They note that neuro-imaging studies 
indicate that anosognosia for hemiplegia is influenced by a number of factors, 
including lesion size and location. In particular, they highlight damage to fronto-
parietal and fronto-parietal-temporal regions as playing a role in unawareness of 
hemiplegia. However, when considering these findings, it should be recognised that 
the method and manner of assessment has a significant influence on the degree to 
which unawareness is detected (Markova & Berrios, 2006; Yeates, Henwood, Gracey 
& Evans, 2006), and there may be a need to re-consider how unawareness is 
assessed both in clinical and research contexts.  
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Evidence from other clinical populations indicates that unawareness can also be a 
behavioural response to many serious or life-changing illnesses (Weinstein & Kahn, 
1955), and in these situations unawareness is attributed to psychological denial. 
According to psychoanalytic theory, denial represents one of the serious forms of 
psychological defence, involving the distortion of significant aspects of internal and 
external reality (Leiper, 2007; pp. 57). It does not so much represent the lack of 
insight, but rather a motivated method of controlling distressing information about 
the self (Kortte & Wegener, 2004). However, recent theories have challenged this 
traditional psychodynamic conceptualisation of denial (Miller & Rollnick, 2002). 
These argue that denial is not so much driven by ego protection, but instead derives 
from discursive ‘traps’ in which the interlocutors engage (e.g. convincing, arguing 
for, blaming, shaming; see Medley & Powell (2010) for a conceptual review in the 
context of brain injury). 
 
Generally any attempt to measure or identify the presence of one causal explanation 
of unawareness (anosognosia or denial) would by default be presumed to identify 
the presence or absence of the other. However, this assumption derives from the 
belief that anosognosia and denial are mutually exclusive (e.g. Levine, Calvani & 
Rinn, 1991), a conclusion for which there is little empirical support. More plausible is 
the view that denial and anosognosia may coexist in different proportions within a 
given individual (Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998) and thus either may be explored 
independently. Nonetheless, there is a substantial disparity in the volumes of 
research investigating these two causal explanations, with relatively few attempting 14 
 
to assess psychological denial. This is partly a consequence of applying Occam’s razor 
to the issue of unawareness following brain injury; given the sudden onset of 
unawareness following neurological insult, a neurological explanation represents the 
most parsimonious explanation. Where research has referred to denial, it has 
typically done so for the purposes of explaining other phenomena, such as the 
relationship between unawareness and depression (e.g. Anson & Ponsford, 2006). 
 
However, perhaps more significant issues are the conceptual and clinical factors 
which undermine the validity of any attempt to assess denial in the context of 
acquired brain injury. The first issue is common to attempts to experimentally 
investigate psychodynamic concepts; that is, there is a need to ensure that 
participant’s behavioural responses are actually linked to the proposed underlying 
construct. For example, Crombez, Beirens, Van Damme, Eccleston & Fontain (2009) 
noted that all the somatisation assessment scales which they reviewed assessed only 
somatic complaints, and did not link these with underlying psychological distress 
(which would have been predicted to occur by psychodynamic theory). Thus in 
relation to denial, unless evidence is provided to the contrary, statements such as 
“at first I had some problems, but now I’m fine” may only be measuring the 
behavioural phenomenon (unawareness) without identifying the cause (e.g. denial 
or anosognosia). 
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The second issue is unique to the measurement of denial following brain injury. 
Specifically, because the existence of unawareness is by definition ‘unreportable’ on 
by the person concerned, it is not possible to verify that a denial state is being 
experienced. This means that for criterion validity to be established, assessment 
measures need to be compared with some other assessment which can confirm the 
denial state (e.g. retrospective interviews with those whose unawareness has 
diminished naturally; O’Callaghan, Powell & Oyebode, 2006). 
 
Given the challenges of assessing denial, it is reasonable to ask how effective are the 
tools which are designed to assess for the presence of denial. To date, there have 
been no systematic reviews of the methods used to assess psychological denial in 
brain-injured participants. However, an initial examination of the relevant literature 
highlights several relevant issues. Firstly, despite being a relatively sparse literature, 
there is substantial variation in the methods that have been used to explore denial 
(including qualitative studies, questionnaires and experimental methods). In order to 
increase the comparability of any assessment of methodological quality, this review 
will focus exclusively on questionnaire measures. Secondly, many studies make 
reference to the possible influence of psychological denial, or cite it as a potential 
explanation for their results (e.g. Anson & Ponsford, 2006), but since the presence of 
denial is typically not the primary focus of those studies, it is often not directly 
measured. Therefore, this review aims to: (1) identify questionnaire measures used 
to directly assess the presence of denial; and (2) determine whether those measures 
which do exist accurately measure the presence of denial. 16 
 
Methodology 
 
Inclusion Criteria 
Studies using questionnaires to directly assess the presence of psychological denial 
following acquired brain injury. 
 
Exclusion Criteria 
Studies that sample participants with neurodegenerative or psychiatric disorders or 
whose participants were not assessed for unawareness were excluded, as were 
those adopting single-case, qualitative or descriptive designs. Review articles or 
commentaries and studies published in language other than English were excluded. 
 
Search strategy 
 
The following population search terms: 
 
(HEAD INJURY or BRAIN INJURY or TBI or ABI or STROKE or CVA)  
 17 
 
were used in combination with: 
 
(ANOSOGNOSIA) or (DENIAL) or (LACK* ADJ2 INSIGHT) or (IMPAIR* ADJ2 INSIGHT) or 
(AWARENESS) or (UNAWARENESS) or (DEFICITS ADJ2 SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS)  
 
Searches were made to the following databases: 
 
MEDLINE 
EMBASE 
Cochrane Center for Controlled Trials 
Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews  
PsychINFO 
Nursing Index 
Health and Psychosocial Instruments 
 
The following limits were applied to searches: 
 
Population: 18 
 
1.  Adult 
2.  >18 years 
Date: 1990- February 2011 
 
Stage 1: 
Using the above search strategy, 1916 abstracts were recovered. All abstracts were 
read by the main author. Two hundred and sixty-seven papers relevant to the review 
were retrieved in full-text format.  
 
Stage 2:  
Full text articles were read by the main author and those failing to meet inclusion 
criteria were removed (220), resulting in 47 articles. Studies were then assessed for 
exclusion criteria, producing twelve articles. 
 
Stage 3: 
Remaining articles were searched to identify questionnaire measures used to 
examine denial. This resulted in eight assessment measures which are detailed 
below:  
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1.  Motivation for Traumatic Brain Injury Rehabilitation Questionnaire (MOT-Q; 
Chervinsky, Ommaya, deJonge, Spektor, Schwab et al., 1998). This 31-item 
scale assesses an individual’s motivation to engage in rehabilitation, and 
includes four sub-scales, including one designed to be sensitive to both denial 
and anosognosia.  Participants are asked to read the items and respond on a 
0-4 rating scale, indicating their agreement with these statements. 
Cumulative totals are produced for each of the four scales. Examples of items 
include, ‘There is nothing wrong with me’ and ‘The head injury has had 
minimal effect on my abilities’. 
2.  Levine Denial of Illness Questionnaire (LDIS; Levine, Warrenburg, Kerns, 
Schwartz, Delaney et al., 1987). This 22-item scale is designed to assess 
psychological denial in physically ill populations. Staff members are asked to 
make ‘yes/ no’ responses which are then collated. Examples of items include 
‘minimisation of illness’, ‘cheerful mood’ and ‘exaggerated self-confidence’. 
3.  Freiburg Questionnaire on Coping with Illness (FQCI; Muthny, 1989). This 23-
item scale is designed to assess coping styles in German-speaking physically ill 
populations. The scale assesses patient’s beliefs, with three items being 
specifically designed to explore denial or minimisation of illness.  
4.  Clinician’s Rating Scale for Evaluating Impaired Self-Awareness and Denial 
of Disability After Brian Injury (CRS; Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998). This 20-item 
scale is designed to assess patients’ behaviour over a specified time period. 
Two 10-item subscales are used to indicate to what extent denial or 
anosognosia are present. Items were developed from the authors’ own 20 
 
clinical experience regarding those behaviours considered to be indicative of 
either cause of unawareness. Staff members are asked to make ‘yes/ no’ 
responses which are then collated for each subscale. Items include, ‘patient 
shows a negative affective reaction when given feedback that he or she may 
be more impaired than he or she reports’. 
5.  Denial Assessment Tool for Stroke (DATS; Christensen, Cook & Martin, 
1997). This 22-item scale is designed to assess patients’ behaviour over a 
specified time period, indicating to what extent denial or anosognosia are 
present. Two 11-item subscales are used to indicate the presence of denial 
and anosognosia. The psychological denial subscale was transposed from the 
Alcohol Denial Assessment Tool (ADAT; Wing, Hansen & Martin, 1994). Staff 
members are asked to make ‘yes/ no’ responses to items which are then 
collated for each subscale. Examples of target behaviours include Cognitive 
Defences (minimization of deficits, blaming others) and Behaviour 
Incongruent with Affect (e.g. ‘clowning’, seduction or mothering of others). 
6.  Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (MCSDS; Crowne & Marlowe, 
1960). This 33-item scale is designed to be an implicit measure of denial, 
assessing socially-desirable responding which has been argued to act as a 
trait measure of ‘defensiveness’. Participants are asked to read the 
questionnaire and to make ‘yes/ no’ responses which are collated. The 
proportion of items ‘incorrectly’ endorsed is taken to indicate the extent to 
which that person is engaging in socially desirable responding. Examples of 21 
 
items include, ‘I always try to practice what I preach’ and ‘I don’t find it 
particularly difficult to get on with loud mouthed, obnoxious people’.  
7.  Symptom Expectancy Checklist (SEC; Mittenberg Di Giuilo, Perrin & Bass, 
1992). This 30-item scale is designed to assess symptom endorsement for 
post-concussion syndrome. Participants are asked to make ‘yes/ no’ 
responses to statements and their results are collated. Ownsworth & 
McFarland (2004) propose that significant disparity between expected and 
achieved scores is indicative of ‘coping-related denial’ or presentation 
management. Examples of items include, ‘I forget where my car was parked’ 
and ‘I have trouble thinking’. 
8.  Emotional Hayling Sentence Completion Task (Emotional Hayling; 
Foutopoulou, Pernigo, Maeda, Rudd & Kopelman, 2010). This 30-item scale is 
designed to be an implicit measure of denial, assessing subjects’ completion 
times for 10 neutral-, negatively-toned and disability-related sentences. 
Latencies are collated for each sentence type with longer latencies believed 
to indicate implicit processing of sentence material. This is in contrast to 
patient’s explicit ratings of how relevant each item was to their present 
situation. Examples of items include neutral- (‘When your car breaks down 
you may need to take it to a ___’); negative- (‘After a severe sexual assault 
your confidence may be ___’), and deficit-related (‘A hoist is sometimes used 
to lift disabled people off the ___’). 
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Assessment of Methodological Quality 
Methodological quality was assessed using a modified version of the rating scale by 
Terwee, Bot, de Boer, van der Windt, Knol et al. (2007) for the assessment of 
measurement properties of health status questionnaires. This scale was devised in 
order to compensate for the lack of explicit criteria for what constitutes good 
measurement (Terwee et al., 2007; pp.32).  This measure identifies several 
psychometric properties which are important when constructing questionnaires for 
use within a health context, such as criterion validity, internal reliability, inter-rater 
reliability and responsivity to change (see table below). 
 
Several modifications were subsequently made to the original scale to increase its 
utility in the present review: (1) The ‘criterion validity’ item [‘Convincing arguments 
that gold standard is “gold” AND correlation with gold standard >0.70’] was replaced 
with a similar item relating specifically to the unawareness context [item 7]; (2) items 
relating to  ‘Floor and ceiling effects’ [‘<15% of the respondents achieved the highest 
or lowest possible scores’], ‘absolute measurement error’ [‘minimal important 
change < smallest detectable change OR minimal important change outside limits of 
agreement’] and ‘interpretability’ [‘mean and standard deviation scores presented of 
at least four subgroups of patients and minimal important change defined’] were 
removed from the original scale due to concerns about applicability to all 
assessment measures; (3) Items were added which assessed whether: (a) 23 
 
questionnaires conflated unawareness and denial [item 6] ; (b) whether the 
measures were validated in a neurological sample [item 8] (see below). 
 
A notable problem with Terwee et al.’s criteria is their request for Cronbach’s alphas 
as part of determining construct validity, particularly since this statistic concerns 
measurement reliability. The present review retained their interpretation of validity 
for the purposes of comparability, although it is acknowledged that this may 
artificially reduce the validity scores of measures that did not adequately explore 
reliability. 
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Table 1: Quality criteria for measurement properties of questionnaires used to assess denial (adapted from Terwee et al., 2007) 
1. Content validity- The extent to which the 
domain of interest is comprehensively sampled 
by the items in the questionnaire 
 
+   A clear description is provided of the measurement aim, the target population, the concepts that are being measured, and the item  
     selection AND target population and (investigators OR experts) were involved in item selection; 
?   A clear description of above-mentioned aspects is lacking OR only target population involved OR doubtful design or method; 
-   No target population involvement; 
0  No information found on target population involvement. 
2. Internal consistency- The extent to which 
items in a (sub) scale are inter-correlated, thus 
measuring the same construct 
 
+  Factor analyses performed on adequate sample size (7 * # items and >100) AND Cronbach’s alpha(s) calculated per dimension AND   
     Cronbach’s alpha(s) between 0.70 and 0.95; 
?  No factor analysis OR doubtful design or method; 
-   Cronbach’s alpha(s) <0.70 or >0.95, despite adequate design and method 
0  No information found on internal consistency. 
3 Construct validity- The extent to which scores 
on a particular questionnaire relate to other 
measures in a manner that is consistent with 
theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the 
concepts that are being measured 
 
+  Specific hypotheses were formulated AND at least 75% of the results are in accordance with these hypotheses; 
?  Doubtful design or method (e.g. no hypotheses); 
-   Less than 75% of hypotheses were confirmed, despite adequate design and methods; 
0  No information found on construct validity. 
4. Reliability- The extent to which patients can 
be distinguished from each other, despite 
measurement errors (relative measurement 
error) 
+  ICC or weighted Kappa >0.70; 
?  Doubtful design or method (e.g., time interval not mentioned); 
-   ICC or weighted Kappa <0.70, despite adequate design and method; 
0  No information found on reliability. 25 
 
5. Responsiveness- The ability of a 
questionnaire to detect clinically important 
changes over time  
 
+  SDC or SDC<MIC OR MIC outside the LOA OR RRO 1.96 OR AUC>0.70; 
?  Doubtful design or method; 
-   SDC or SDC>MIC OR MIC equals or inside LOA OR RR<1.96 OR AUC   
    <0.70, despite adequate design and methods; 
0   No information found on responsiveness. 
6. Construct validity- Does the assessment 
method conflate the measurement of denial 
with measurement of unawareness? 
+   No 
-    Yes 
7. Criterion validity- Is independent evidence 
provided that the person was experiencing 
psychological denial as opposed to anosognosia 
at the time? 
+   Yes 
-    No 
8. Clinical Population- Was the measure 
validated in an acquired brain injury 
population?     
+   Yes 
-    No 
 
MIC= minimal important change; SDC= smallest detectable change; LOA= limits of ICC= Intraclass correlation; SD= standard deviation; (+) = positive rating; 
(?) = indeterminate rating; (-) = negative rating; 0 = no information available. Doubtful design = lacking a clear description of the design or methods of the 
study, sample size smaller than 50 subjects (should be at least 50 in every (subgroup) analysis), or any important methodological weakness in the design or 
execution of the study.  
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Results 
Table 2: Quality ratings of assessment measures 
  Quality Rating Criteria 
Measure  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
MOT-Q  +  ?  ?  +  0  -  -  + 
LDIS  +  ?  +  -  +  -  -  + 
FCQI  +  -  0  0  0  -  -  - 
CRS  +  0  ?  0  0  -  -  + 
DATS  ?  ?  0  ?  ?  -  -  + 
MCSDS  +  ?  ?  +  0  +  -  - 
SEC  ?  +  0  +  0  +  -  + 
Emotional 
Hayling 
+  0  0  0  0  +  -  + 
 
(+) = positive rating; (?) = indeterminate rating; (-) = negative rating; 0 = no information available 
 
There is substantial variability in the methodological attributes of measures used to 
assess psychological denial in the context of unawareness (Table 1). However, other 
factors need to be considered when determining the ‘overall quality’ of a given 
measure, as the cumulative number of positive and negative ratings may not be the best 
indicator of quality. In this context, the potential conflation of constructs believed to 
represent unawareness and denial poses significant problems for the internal 
consistency of an assessment method. Where this does occur, it is possible that a 
measure could potentially be more sensitive to a different construct from that intended.  
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In addition, the absence of some form of criterion validity (e.g. relationship with later 
self-report/ response to psychological treatment) also makes it difficult to determine 
whether the questionnaire is in fact assessing denial as opposed to general 
unawareness. Either factor is important in establishing the presence of denial in the 
context of unawareness; however, both are probably needed for firmer conclusions to 
be drawn. Although general methodological quality is important when considering the 
relative value of measures, these two additional factors pose the greatest threat to the 
validity of a measure of denial in this context and so they will be weighted more heavily 
when considering a questionnaire’s worth. 
 
The Motivation for Traumatic Brain Injury Rehabilitation Questionnaire (Chervinsky et 
al., 1998) possesses relatively good methodological quality, including its validation in a 
large brain-injured sample. However, despite being designed to measure both denial 
and anosognosia, there is no evidence of two separate factors developing within the 
broader ‘lack of awareness’ construct (e.g. Chervinsky et al., 1998). Furthermore, the 
surface structure of the items could be sensitive to the presence of reports of 
unawareness, rather than specifically to psychological denial. Finally, there is no 
indication of the authors relating their measure to later self-report or some other proof 
that denial was indeed present during the unawareness. Another issue pertains to the 
scale’s relationship with the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2). 
Crowne & Marlowe (1960) argue that defensiveness (a synonym for denial) should be 
distinct from psychopathology. They believed that their scale’s (MCSDS) poor  
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correlations with the MMPI was a significant strength. Therefore, it remains necessary 
to ascertain exactly what components of unawareness the MOT-Q is measuring. 
 
The Levine Denial of Illness Scale (Levine et al., 1987) achieved good methodological 
ratings, although it should be noted that these were derived from patients with 
coronary heart disease. A later study confirmed the two-factor structure of the scale 
(Levine et al., 1994), albeit with small numbers of patients post-CVA (n=19). However, as 
with the MOT-Q this measure suffers from its items potentially being more sensitive to 
brain injured participants’ unawareness rather than denial specifically. Furthermore, the 
criterion validity of this scale has not been established, something that is particularly 
important given the challenges faced in when applying it to unaware populations. A final 
limitation is that it was not possible to examine the original version of the scale, as 
Levine et al. (1994) provided an incomplete reference. As such, assessment of the scale 
was based on inferences made from the information provided in Levine et al. (1994). 
 
The Freiburg Questionnaire on Coping with Illness (Muthny, 1989) was developed as a 
German language coping styles questionnaire. Assessment of methodological quality of 
the scale as a whole was poor, with shortcomings identified regarding reliability and 
factor strength. Specifically, Nickel, Wunsch, Egle, Lohse & Otto (2002) found that the 
internal consistency of the scale was poor, even when problematic items were removed. 
A further difficulty is that although the studies employing it have been in English, it was 
not possible to examine an English language version of the scale. This means that  
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inferences were made from a brief description of the three ‘minimisation’ items in 
Hermann et al. (2000). However, even with an English translation available there would 
be the risk of losing nuances of meaning in the translation. 
 
The Clinician’s Rating Scale (Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998) also exhibited weaknesses when 
assessed for methodological quality. Specifically, difficulties were identified with item 
development, where items were developed from the authors’ observations, but without 
any evidence that these in fact measured denial. Furthermore, inter-rater agreement on 
categorisations was derived from only a subset of the initial participant sample, and was 
only marginally above chance (58%). The lack of criterion validity was accompanied by 
the potential conflation of items in relation to unawareness and denial. 
 
Shortcomings were evident when the Denial Assessment Tool for Stroke (Christensen et 
al., 1997) was assessed for methodological quality, with a small sample and 
inappropriate statistics used to determine the reliability of the sample. As with the CRS, 
items were developed from the authors’ own observations, but without evidence that 
these in fact measured denial rather than some other behavioural phenotype. 
Furthermore, some of these behaviours (e.g. minimising; attributing to others) may 
simply reflect participants’ ways of explaining their deficits due to unawareness, rather 
than denial specifically. These issues notwithstanding, a unique strength of the DATS is 
that it is the only measure of those examined which has used a prospective design. 
Christensen et al. (1997) examined the profiles of patients at several time points post- 
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CVA, noting that denial- and neurologically-related unawareness behaviours varied as 
time elapsed. While this suggests that the use of denial varies as recovery from the 
stroke progresses, caution must be observed. Given the issues described earlier with 
item development, it could mean that observations of a specific set of behaviours 
increased in reliability over this period, rather than denial per se increasing. 
 
The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) performed 
favourably on assessment, with good internal consistency and reliability. Denial items 
are not conflated with the behavioural symptoms of unawareness, although there was 
no evidence of criterion validity in an unaware sample. However, there remain several 
issues associated with the use of this measure in a brain-injured population. Firstly, 
despite its use in brain-injured samples (e.g. Ownsworth & McFarland, 2004; 
Ownsworth et al., 2004) the MCSDS has not been validated in this patient group. 
Secondly, it is unclear whether one can infer that, having the propensity to generally 
respond defensively (e.g. Ramanah & Martin, 1980) a person was engaging in 
psychological denial at that particular moment in time. The MCSDS was used by Levine 
et al. (1987) for the purposes of establishing the discriminant validity of the LDIS, and 
they argued that as a trait measure of defensiveness, it was quite different from the 
concept of denial exhibited in physically-ill populations. This was supported by later 
analysis showing it to be uncorrelated with the LDIS in a coronary heart disease sample. 
This raises questions about what exactly is being measured by the MCSDS, as well as 
how this relates other conceptualisations of denial or presentation management.   
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The Symptom Expectancy Checklist (Mittenberg et al., 1992) performs equally 
favourably with the highest rated measures in terms of general methodological quality 
and its development in a brain-injured sample provides adequate validity. However, 
more problematic is its use as a measure of ‘coping-related denial’ (e.g. Ownsworth & 
McFarland, 2004). The authors argue that it provides a measure of under-reporting of 
common everyday problems resulting from head injury, with low-symptom reporting 
being indicative of subjects minimising their problems. However, this line of reasoning is 
open to question, as the SEC may simply be an example of a self-report measure of 
unawareness, where the degree of impairment is inferred by comparing scores with 
control group responses. This does not mean that this measure lacks value; simply that 
it is uncertain how it can meaningfully be applied in the context of unawareness. 
 
The Emotional Hayling task (Foutopoulou et al., 2010) performed unfavourably in terms 
of methodological quality, with untested constructs and limited validation in 
neurological samples. Nonetheless, it may still represent the basis of a promising 
method of assessing psychological denial, as the strength of the measure lies less in its 
overall psychometric properties and more in its discrimant validity. Foutopoulou et al. 
(2010) found that those with unawareness for hemiplegia were uniquely slowed when 
completing sentences containing deficit-related material, as compared with neutral or 
negative emotion-related items. This was in comparison to hemiplegic patients with 
awareness of their deficits, who were not slow on any items. Importantly, explicit  
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ratings of how relevant items were to participants were similar for both groups. 
Although this measure does not address the issue of criterion validity, its use of an 
implicit measure avoids the problem of conflating participants’ responses to unaware 
and denial constructs. 
 
Discussion 
 
The above narrative outlines three approaches to measuring denial which have been 
adopted so far: those inferring denial from participants’ beliefs about their deficits; 
observing behavioural indicators of denial; using implicit measures of denial and 
defensiveness. In terms of their ability to assess denial in the context of unawareness, 
these three sets of measures appear to perform quite differently. 
 
On the basis of current research, measures of patients’ beliefs about their deficits (SEC; 
MOT-Q; Freiburg Questionnaire on Coping with Illness) are unlikely to be uniquely 
assessing denial in this context. In the cases of the MOT-Q and Freiburg, this is likely to 
do with the manner in which information about denial is obtained. Patients’ responses 
could reflect beliefs about whether they have any deficits (unawareness), rather than 
measuring any underlying reasons for this being the case (e.g. denial). The SEC is a 
methodologically sound measure of symptoms following mild head injury, although it is 
questionable whether it actually assesses ‘coping-related denial’, since there is no 
necessary relationship between lower symptom reporting and denial specifically. Most  
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of these questionnaire measures which have been used to examine denial possess good 
psychometric properties, and difficulties observed in this specific context should not be 
taken to imply poor utility in other clinical populations or scenarios. 
 
Behavioural measures (LDIS, CRS and DATS) experience similar methodological 
difficulties to the previous group of belief measures, particularly in relation to the 
manner in which items were created, as well as their reliance on unverified behavioural 
indicators of denial. Specifically, it is not that the behavioural indicators are in 
themselves problematic, simply that some form of independent evidence is needed to 
show that they map onto denial rather than unawareness. However, in contrast to the 
measures of patients’ beliefs discussed above, later research has provided some 
evidence of construct validity, or responsiveness of denial items to change over time for 
behavioural measures (e.g. Kortte, Wegener & Chwalisz, 2003; Christensen et al., 1997). 
This suggests that something relating to unawareness and denial is being measured, 
although it is unclear what exactly this is. 
 
Implicit measures (MCSDS and Emotional Hayling) represent the most methodologically 
robust attempts to assess denial in the context of unawareness. Their greatest strength 
is that because they assess underlying constructs rather than behavioural phenomena, 
they are unlikely to conflate denial with patients’ unaware states. The psychometric 
properties of the measures vary significantly, as do the implications of this on their 
utility. The MCSDS is the most psychometrically robust, which is particularly important  
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given that it is a self-report questionnaire. The Emotional Hayling is less 
psychometrically sound than the MCSDS, although its format lessens any negative 
impact of this in terms of sensitivity and value. 
 
This review highlights several methodological issues which need to be addressed by 
future research. Firstly, there is a need to assess the construct validity of assessment 
measures in unaware neurological samples, particularly regarding the extent to which 
measures supposedly assessing the same theoretical constructs (i.e. denial) are related. 
Preliminary evidence exists (e.g. Ownsworth, McFarland & Young, 2002; Levine et al., 
1987) although this needs to be examined thoroughly in this unique context. Criterion 
validity should also be explored, either by comparing responses on questionnaires with 
later self-reports (e.g. O’Callaghan et al., 2006), or following psychological therapy 
designed to reduce denial (e.g. Motivational Interviewing). 
 
There is also a need for prospective designs in this area of research, particularly given 
that unawareness is a phenomenon known to change over time (Jehkonen, Ahonem, 
Dastidar, Laippala & Vilkki, 2000). Denial may conceivably coexist with anosognosia and 
contribute to a person’s overall state of unawareness (Prigatano & Klonoff, 1998), with 
the balance differing from person to person (e.g. Foutopoulou et al., 2010) as well as 
over time (e.g. Christensen et al., 1997). Furthermore, prospective designs would also 
address an issue that was absent from almost all measures, namely a lack of data on the 
responsiveness of numerous measures to clinically significant change.  
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However, this raises the question of why these methodological issues have not already 
been addressed if they are of such importance to this area of research. One possible 
explanation is that increasing criticism of the ethics and validity of using psychoanalytic 
concepts has reduced the volume of research in this area (e.g. Crombez et al., 2009). 
This may in part represent a shift away from Freudian concepts that are frequently 
considered to be poorly defined or operationalised, combined with the increasing 
dominance of cognitive theory within clinical psychology. Recent theoretical and 
experimental work which has successfully explored psychodynamic theory (e.g. Fonagy 
& Target, 2006; Turnbull et al., 2002) has made significant efforts to operationalise 
concepts and to test the hypothesised neurocognitive processes. Alternatively, it could 
be that the methodological changes suggested in this review present practical barriers 
that are disproportionate to any benefits that could be derived from overcoming them. 
For example, in order to produce a subset of patients whose unawareness has receded 
(as would be needed to overcome problems of criterion validity), very large initial 
samples of unaware patients would likely be required. Would this investment of 
resources represent value for money and produce clinically meaningful results? 
 
A final issue relates to the ethics of examining denial in those with acquired brain injury. 
Assessing for the presence of denial may allow rehabilitation staff to tailor treatments 
to a patient’s unique needs. However, there is also the risk that ill-considered use of an 
assessment measure could result in denial becoming a diagnostic label given to a  
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patient. There is a concern that this may have a negative influence on the care which 
they receive, and that the label will remain with them long after it has become relevant 
or appropriate. The issue of inappropriate use of assessment measures is not unique to 
denial of deficits, and has long been a topic of discussion in neuropsychology (see 
Gottfredson & Saklofske, 2009 for a discussion of intelligence testing), and this issue 
remains important regardless of whether assessment measures of denial are actually 
valid. Staff and relative behaviour can be affected by the outcome of an assessment, 
irrespective of the validity of that process. 
 
As such, any attempt to assess denial needs to be informed by the principles of clinical 
neuropsychology (e.g. Cubelli & Della Sala, 2011). Specifically, it should be driven by a 
clear clinical purpose, and conducted in the context of present theoretical 
understanding of the aetiology, nature and course of unawareness (e.g. Marcel , Tegner 
& Nimmo-Smith., 2004).  Importantly, it should be considered only the beginning of a 
broader formulation of psychological status or function, and as with any formulation, 
must be open to revision in light of new information. Thus while this review does not 
advocate restricting the assessment of denial, it does recommend giving serious 
consideration to the clinical and social implications of carrying it out.  
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Conclusion 
 
This review has drawn together those assessment measures used to assess denial in the 
context of acquired brain injury. These measures vary substantially in methodological 
quality, as well as in the probability that they measure denial in the context of 
unawareness. On the basis of this review, the most promising measures of denial in 
brain injury are the Emotional Hayling and Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, 
due to their avoidance of conflating the behavioural responses of unawareness and 
denial. However, there are a number of methodological issues associated with both 
scales, including lack of adequate validation in brain-injured samples and unproven 
criterion validity. On the basis of current research, it is argued that the other assessment 
measures’ conflation of unawareness and denial means that they lack meaningful 
validity when assessing denial. The clinical and ethical implications associated with this 
should preclude their use until further research is conducted. 
 
Denial following brain-injury will continue to be a difficult area in which to conduct 
research. The most practical method of addressing these difficulties entails establishing 
the convergent validity of those assessment measures currently employed (e.g. MCSDS, 
Emotional Hayling; LDIS; CRS; DATS). The second entails establishing criterion validity by 
means of retrospective reviews with participants whose unawareness has reduced. 
More generally there is a need for research to move beyond the simplistic 
understanding of this phenomenon attributed to Weinstein & Kahn (1955) and engage  
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with modern understandings of denial (e.g. Foutopoulou et al., 2010; Miller & Rollnick, 
2002). Specifically, this means utilising qualitative and experimental designs to explore 
how denial may manifest in those with acquired brain injury and how these relate to 
current assessment measures.   
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Lay Summary 
Brain injury is often associated with difficulties in dealing with novel, poorly-structured 
or complex problems. A common problem occurs with an ability called 'prospective 
memory' (PM). PM is an important faculty that enables us to put our plans into action at 
a later time. PM is particularly susceptible to the effects of brain injury, because it 
requires a number of different mental processes for it to work properly. This study 
attempts to improve impaired PM performance in those with brain injury using a 
training technique called ‘Implementation Intentions’, which  encourage participants to 
use imagery. They aim to set up strong associations between a particular behaviour, and 
a cue that signals when it is time for them to act. To assess the effectiveness of this 
intervention, brain-injured participants were randomly placed into two groups. Both 
groups received a brief intervention to improve problem-solving and planning skills 
(Goal Management Training).  Participants then received either implementation 
intentions training (experimental group), or an imagery training exercise that wasn’t 
expected to work (control group). The results showed that there was no meaningful 
difference between the treatments, and that those receiving the control intervention 
improved just as much as those receiving the implementation intentions training. This 
may be due to several factors, including the abilities of participants in each group, the 
intensity and duration of training, or the way in which participants were assessed.  
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Abstract 
Introduction: Deficits in executive function (e.g. planning, problem-solving, prospective 
memory) following brain injury are associated with significant negative social and 
occupational outcomes. Prospective memory (PM) is particularly susceptible to the 
effects of brain injury, as it relies on controlled attentional resources to establish and 
recall intentions. Implementation intentions (II) have been shown to improve 
performance on prospective memory tasks across a variety of durations, by 
circumventing controlled attention and establishing strong cue-action associations using 
imagery and declarative statements. 
Aims: To determine the efficacy of a theory-based training intervention for prospective 
memory deficits following acquired brain injury. 
Methods: A single-blind, randomised trial was used to assess the efficacy of 
implementation intentions as compared to a control intervention for individuals with 
acquired brain injury. A within-between repeated measures designs was used. 
Participants were assessed using an ecologically valid measure of executive function. 
Results: No significant differences in interaction effects were found according to 
treatment allocation. Use of baseline performance, estimated premorbid intelligence, 
depression, fluid intelligence and processing speed as covariates did not result in 
significant changes to the effectiveness of interventions. 
Discussion: The lack of treatment effect may be attributable to several factors, including 
the interaction of severity of impairments, length of training, and complexity of the  
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outcome measure. The appropriateness of group designs when assessing 
neuropsychological rehabilitation is also discussed.  
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Introduction 
 
Executive function refers to the higher-order processing of internally- and externally-
generated stimuli (Burgess, Dumontheil & Gilbert, 2007), and includes abilities such as 
planning, concept formation, impulse control, metacognition and self-monitoring. 
Deficits in executive function have been associated with significant impairment in 
everyday functioning, leading to poor vocational and social outcomes (Mazauk, Masson, 
Levin, Alaoui, Mauretta et al., 1997). Executive deficits have historically been 
conceptualised as a largely homogenous syndrome, such as ‘frontal lobe syndrome’, and 
most recently ‘dysexecutive syndrome’ (Burgess et al., 2006). However, recent 
investigations have questioned the validity of this syndromal perspective (e.g. Stuss & 
Alexander, 2007), with more comprehensive models acknowledging the separation of 
function within a broader attentional system. 
 
In their influential model of executive function, Shallice & Burgess (1996) delineate the 
processes involved in the executive system used for complex everyday tasks. They 
propose that in response to a given situation, individuals construct temporary new 
schemas (behavioural templates or protocols used to achieve a goal). This can occur 
spontaneously, or through a process of problem solving (an iterative cycle involving 
problem formation, deepening of the solving attempt, and establishment of a ‘success 
criterion’ against which later solution attempts are compared). Once developed, schema 
are implemented in accordance with ‘contention scheduling’ (the process of choosing  
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between well-established action sequences and thought processes; Burgess et al., 
2007). However, to function efficiently in real-world tasks, two special purpose 
processes are used. Firstly, to reduce the cognitive load associated with constructing 
new schema, an episodic/ autobiographical memory system is used to provide similar 
experiences when confronted with novel situations and problems. Secondly, where 
schema are not to be implemented immediately, a prospective memory (PM) 
component assists in creating and realizing the schema later. 
 
This prospective memory component appears to be particularly susceptible to the 
effects of brain injury, with deficits frequently appearing following injury (e.g. Shum, 
Valentine & Cutmore, 1999). Failures in prospective memory are both familiar and 
important, as they range from the benign but irritating (forgetting to post a letter or 
meet a friend), to the potentially disastrous (leaving pots burning on the stove). Shallice 
& Burgess (1991) argue that having identified a ‘to-be-remembered’ task, a person 
creates an ‘intention marker’, a neural trigger represented within a three-dimensional 
cognitive space. When a person’s conscious attention later encounters an intention 
marker, it brings the intention into awareness again and inhibits current ongoing 
activity. It is argued that failure of prospective memory is frequently a result of ‘goal 
neglect’ (Duncan, Emslie, Williams, Johnson & Fraser, 1996) or ‘strategy application 
disorder’ (Shallice & Burgess, 1991). While these two deficits give rise to subtly differing 
patterns of behaviour, they both result in the failure to carry out appropriate activities  
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given a relevant intentional cue. Importantly, this is in spite of accurate verbal recall of 
the intention to be carried out. 
 
There are two forms of prospective memory tasks: time-based (remembering to do 
something at a particular time e.g. cooking, meeting a friend), and event-based 
(remembering to do something on the occurrence of a specific prompt, such as passing 
a message onto a friend when you see him/her). It has been argued that time-based 
prospective tasks provoke a considerably greater cognitive load than event-based 
remembering, particularly given the absence of environmental cues to provoke recall 
(Einstein, McDaniel, Thomas, Mayfield, Shank et al., 2005; Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007). 
Factors that have been shown to influence event-based recall include cue salience, 
relevance, the propositional structure of intentions and the strength of cue-intention 
association (e.g. McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; McDaniel, Guynn, Einstein & Breneiser, 
2004). 
 
Explanations for time-based prospective memory have received significantly less 
attention (Kvalilashvili & Fisher, 2007), with the competing models being the test-wait-
test-exit model (TWTE) and random-walk model (Harris & Wilkins, 1982; Wilkins 1979). 
TWTE argues that successful performance is dependent on the monitoring of time, 
possibly using an internal clock, accompanied by occasional checks that increase in a J-
shaped curve towards the target time. Alternatively, according to the random-walk  
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model of prospective memory, the intention sits within a multidimensional 
representation of consciousness, triggered only when the person’s attention 
accidentally stumbles upon it or upon closely related concepts within the internal or 
external environment (e.g. events or concepts relating to time). As compared to the 
TWTE model, the random-walk model implies that few- if any- attentional resources are 
required to trigger a time-based intention. 
 
A number of interventions have attempted to rehabilitate deficits in prospective 
memory; however, in considering them, an important distinction must be made 
between rehabilitation approaches aiming to compensate for deficits (by providing 
neurological and/or environmental support for a deficit), and those that seek to 
ameliorate lost abilities through training (Evans, 2006). Manly, Hawkins, Evans, Woldt & 
Robertson (2001) and Fish, Evans, Nimmo, Martin, Kersel et al. (2007) adopt the former 
approach, using intermittent prompts to cue prospective memory tasks in patients with 
traumatic brain injury. They found that even when prompts were semi-random, and 
were non-contingent with the cue, they nonetheless produced significant improvements 
in performance compared with controls. Manly et al. (2001) argue that the prompt 
provides external support for intentional markers that are competing for expression, 
orienting attention away from the immediate task. This explanation is consistent with 
Burgess et al. (2007) ‘gateway hypothesis’ of attentional control, which argues that 
aspects of lateral and medial rostral Brodmann Area 10  are responsible for mediating  
  54
between stimulus-oriented and stimulus-independent cognition; essentially the 
switching of attention between the outside environment and one’s internal goals. 
 
Remedial or training-based interventions for PM deficits can be divided into those 
looking at Goal Management Training (Robertson, 1996) and those looking at 
Implementation Intentions (Gollwitzer, 1999). Levine, Robertson, Claire, Carter, Hong et 
al. (2000) randomised participants with brain injury to either Goal Management Training 
(GMT) or Motor Skills Training (MST), and assessed their performance on a proof 
reading task (participants were to circle numbers, underline fruits and vegetables, and 
put an ‘X’ through liquids). They found that those assigned to GMT were significantly 
slower and more accurate than the MST group, taken to indicate the greater application 
of care and attention to the task in hand. However, other studies have provided 
equivocal support for the use of GMT in prospective memory. For example, Brown & 
Evans (in preparation) assessed PM performance on a virtual reality task following brief 
GMT training and using auditory alerts, with the treatment group showing improvement 
on a measure of event-based PM. There was no overall improvement on other 
measures of time- and event-based PM (although this may be due to ceiling effects on 
the task performance). 
 
There are, however, important qualitative differences between the tasks used in these 
studies, and the null findings may reflect incompatibility between GMT and specific PM 
tasks rather than the absence of potential effect. For example, the proof-reading task  
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used by Levine et al. (2000) is a highly structured PM task, akin to those used in 
experimental investigations of PM. It is possible that given a task where an individual is 
engaged in spotting stimuli (with few- if any- external distractions or competing tasks), 
the intention remains in conscious attention throughout. However, when an intention is 
to be activated while the individual simultaneously performs other demanding tasks 
(e.g. Brown & Evans, in preparation), GMT may not in itself provide sufficient assistance, 
even with auditory alerts to remind them of their training and their intention. 
Nonetheless, GMT is likely to be a critical part of the process, as it supports the 
development of clear planning. 
 
In contrast, implementation intentions (II) are explicit statements about a person’s 
intentions when they detect a particular cue (e.g. ‘when I see X, I will do Y’), and 
includes the use of imagery to create a rich mental representation of possible stimuli 
which may also occur with the cue. Implementation intentions are believed to work, not 
only because they establish a strong cue-response association, but also because they 
circumvent the need for controlled attention to realize the intention. Importantly, II 
have been shown to be effective in both event- and time-based PM tasks. For example, 
Prestwich, Conner, Lawton, Bailey, Litman et al. (2005) used II to promote breast self-
examination, and found that a statement linking the specific intention and a 
commitment to self-examining in the next month was found to increase both the 
likelihood and frequency of self-examination at one- and six-month follow-up. Similarly, 
Liu & Park (2004) looked at the effect of II on accuracy of blood glucose checking in  
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older adults, and found that those using II performed tests nearly 50% more often than 
controls over a period of three weeks. This study also suggests that II may work even 
where there are no inherent motivators, as none of the participants had diabetes. 
 
Using a neurologically impaired sample, Kardiasmenos, Clawson, Wilken & Wallin (2008) 
allocated patients with Multiple Sclerosis to either II or control conditions, following 
which they were then tested on a board game intended to simulate the prospective 
memory requirements of everyday life. They found a significant difference between the 
MS intervention and control groups, with the intervention group showing a greater 
proportion of correct event-based PM responses in the task. Lengfelder & Gollwitzer 
(2001) found that II had a significant effect in improving dual-tasking performance in 
those with frontal brain injury. Unfortunately, the practical implications of this study are 
unclear, as the study did not explore the impact of II on functional or ecologically valid 
measures. 
 
Consequently, there is a need to explore further the impact which II have on PM 
performance in those with brain injury. This study aimed to expand on the work of 
Lengfelder & Gollwitzer (2001), exploring the impact of implementation intentions in 
those with acquired brain injury, but using ecologically valid outcome measures. 
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Aims and hypotheses: 
 
This study aimed to: 
·  Determine the efficacy of a theory-based training intervention for prospective 
memory. 
 
Hypotheses 
1.  Participants receiving combined GMT and implementation intention 
training will perform significantly better on primary outcome measures of 
prospective memory and executive function than those allocated to 
combined GMT and control intervention. 
2.  Participants receiving combined GMT and implementation intention 
training will perform significantly better on secondary measures of 
planning and prospective memory (Removals Task) than those allocated 
to combined GMT and control intervention 
 
Methodology 
 
Design 
 
A single-blind, randomised within-between group design was used. The between-
subjects factor was intervention (GMT+ Implementation Intentions vs. GMT+  control  
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imagery intervention), and the within-subjects factor was time (baseline and post-
treatment).  
 
Participants 
 
Recruitment sources 
Participants were recruited and tested between December 2010 and June 2011 from 
health service and charitable organisations for people with brain injury in Ayrshire, 
Glasgow, Falkirk and Edinburgh. Participants were tested at the locations they were 
recruited from, and at the Community Treatment Centre for Brain Injury (Gorbals, 
Glasgow) and the Sackler Institute for Psychobiological Research (Southern General 
Hospital, Glasgow). 
 
Inclusion Criteria 
Inclusion criteria for the present study were adults with acquired brain injury, aged 
between 18 and 65 who demonstrated significant impairments in executive functioning. 
This was defined as scores of less than 9 on the JAAM Prospective Memory subscale.  
 
Exclusion criteria 
Participants were excluded if they were less than 6 months post-injury, had a diagnosed 
premorbid learning disability, were experiencing concurrent severe mental illness, or 
were currently abusing drugs or alcohol, . Those suffering from a degenerative  
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neurological disorder,  had severe dyslexia or visual impairments, or who were unable to 
provide informed consent (Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) 2000 Act) to participate in 
research were also excluded. Due to the nature of the testing materials, those who 
spoke English as a second language were excluded. 
 
Twenty-one participants with acquired brain injury (ABI) were recruited (see below): 
 
Calculation of sample size 
The planned analysis for this study was ANOVA, with one between subjects variable 
(group) and one within subjects repeated measure (time - assessment occasion). 
GPower (v 3.1.2) (Faul et al., 2009) was used to estimate sample size required to detect 
whether the intervention group had improved more than the control group, reflected in 
a significant group x time interaction term in the ANOVA. The effect size estimate used 
in this analysis was based on the effect size obtained in the study of Kardiasmenos et al. 
(2008). Adopting an implementation intention intervention, they used a neurologically-
impaired sample and a functionally-relevant outcome measure of PM. Their analysis 
achieved a very large effect size (η2= 0.227) across the group x time interaction effect in 
a repeated-measures ANOVA. 
 
For the present study, which uses a less directive training than Kardiasmenos et al., a 
more conservative approach was taken, using a medium-large effect size (η2= 0.109; 
Cohen’s f =0.35), with α= 0.05. With these parameters, 20 participants would be  
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required in total to achieve power of 0.8. It was therefore decided that to be even more 
cautious and aim to recruit 26 participants.  
 
Ethics 
Ethical approval for NHS and non-NHS sites was obtained from the West of Scotland 
Research Ethics Service (WoSRES). Research and Development approval for NHS sites 
was obtained from NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde and NHS Ayrshire & Arran. Separate 
approval was obtained from respective non-NHS sites 
 
Measures 
Demographic (age, gender, education and socio-economic status) and clinical (nature of 
injury, time since injury; estimated post-traumatic amnesia and GCS) information was 
collected during telephone screening. Socio-economic status was determined using the 
Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) system according to participants’ 
postcode. 
 
The following baseline measures were used to characterise the sample: Adapted 
Dysexecutive Questionnaire (DEX; Chaytor, Schmitter-Edgecombe & Burr, 2006); 
Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire (PRMQ; Crawford, Smith, Maylor, 
Della Sala & Logie, 2003); Goal Management Questionnaire (GMQ; Manly, Robertson & 
Levine, personal communication); Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; The 
Psychological Corporation, 2001); Rey Complex Figure Test (Immediate and Delayed)  
  61
(Meyers & Meyers, 1985); Logical memory (Immediate and Delayed) subtests of 
Wechsler Memory Scale (WMS-III); Symbol-digit Modalities Test (Smith, 1968); Matrix 
Reasoning subtest from Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 1997); 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1989); Tower Test (D-
KEFS, Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System; Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 2001); 
Cambridge Prospective Memory Test (CAMPROMPT; Wilson, Emslie, Foley, Shiel, 
Hawkins et al. 2005). 
 
Primary outcome measures 
 
The following measures were used to assess the efficacy of the intervention: 
 
·  JAAM Virtual Reality test (Jansari, Agnew, Akesson & Murphy, 2004) was used to 
assess pre- and post- intervention functioning. The JAAM is a computer-based 
task which requires participants to complete PM tasks, such as responding to 
memos, within a virtual office environment. This task has good ecological face 
validity, requiring participants to respond to ill-defined problems. Participants 
receive separate scores for planning and PM components, which contribute to a 
total measure of executive function. Separate scores are given for planning and 
prospective memory, with the latter divided into three types of tasks: action-, 
event- and time-based tasks.  
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·  Removals Task (Third Dimension, 2005) was used post-intervention to assess for 
generalisation of strategies. This is a computer-based task which requires 
participants to remove items of furniture from a house, while completing certain 
PM tasks (e.g. remembering to close doors, checking the front door after a set 
period). Participants are given a score for the efficiency of the strategy that they 
adopt, errors that they make during this process, and different measures of 
prospective memory. Due to ceiling effects observed in Brown & Evans (in 
preparation) a modified version with auditory distraction was used. 
 
Procedure 
Potential participants were identified by staff at recruitment sites using screening forms.  
Written information about the study was provided to potential participants, asking 
them to contact the researchers if they were interested. Individuals who expressed 
interest but did not contact the researcher were provided with a reminder letter at their 
next routine clinical contact; however, further prompting was not pursued beyond this 
point. Contact details were provided to researchers either directly by the participant, or 
via a designated member of their care team. Potential participants were screened for 
eligibility via telephone and those meeting inclusion criteria were included in the study. 
Questionnaires (Patient and carer PRMQ, Carer DEX & Patient and Carer GMQ) were 
then posted out to participants for completion 1-2 weeks prior to their appointment. 
Appointments were arranged via telephone and were followed-up with a letter; an offer 
was made to participants for a telephone reminder 24 hours before testing sessions.  
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They were asked to bring to the completed questionnaire to first appointment; those 
who did not were asked to complete them during the first appointment. Participants 
attended three separate sessions at approved locations (see above). The first two 
sessions lasted approximately 2- 2 ½ hours each, and involved completing background 
neuropsychological tests as well as specific measures of executive function. The third 
session lasted approximately 2 ½ - 3 hours and involved a training intervention and 
further neuropsychological testing (see above). Participants were debriefed following 
the third session and told of their group allocation. Adaptations were made for 
individuals with motor or sensory impairments, and breaks were provided throughout 
testing.  
 
Randomisation and blinding 
Randomisation to intervention was carried out 1-month prior to testing by a researcher 
unconnected with the study. Randomisation took place using a random number 
generator and was blocked to ensure an equal number of participants were allocated to 
each group. Participants’ allocations were concealed in envelopes in testing files, and 
were only opened by the researcher immediately before the intervention session. This 
study was single blinded, in that those carrying out the intervention, assessing 
participants and marking responses were aware of participant allocation, but the 
participants themselves were not made aware of their allocation until the completion of 
the post-intervention assessment. 
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Interventions 
 
Brief Goal Management Training (see Levine et al., 2000) was undertaken initially with 
all participants to assist with the ability to form intentions. Participants were asked to: 
Stop; Ask “What is my goal”; List the steps; and Learn the Steps. They were given real-
world examples to use to practice these stages. This phase of training lasted 
approximately 15 minutes and occurred prior to both the experimental and control 
imagery interventions; in total, training took 45- 60 minutes. 
 
Experimental Intervention 
 
The experimental intervention focussed on the specific components of Implementation 
Intentions as well as on those influencing the successful recall of prospective cues: (1) 
Intention formation- this includes the use of imagery and errorless learning strategies to 
learn associations between target cues and desired actions (for example, visualising 
themselves immediately performing the action when they see the cue); (2) Event-based 
PM recall strategies (for example, manipulating the salience of the cue in terms of size, 
appearance and salience; (3) Time-based PM recall strategies (for example, using 
imagery to increase associations between cues and time-based objects and concepts 
(see Appendix 2 for a detailed description).  
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Control Intervention 
 
The control intervention faithfully employed GMT techniques and terminology, but used 
a non-specific imagery training exercise adopted by Evans, Wilson, Schuri, Andrade, 
Baddeley et al. (2000). This involved using imagery to draw the first letter of the cue 
onto the face of a person that they know well. While this has been shown to improve 
name recall in amnesic patients, it was not expected to improve prospective memory 
(see Appendix 2). 
 
Participants were presented with sheets of laminated paper containing the individual 
learning points of the interventions. Training took place using errorless learning with 
increasing cues, and participants were provided with prompts and examples throughout 
this process to assist with learning the strategies. To assist with generalisation, a variety 
of training tasks were used, including well- and poorly-structured problems, as well as a 
naturalistic divided attention task. 
 
Statistical methods 
Boxplot graphs and the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test were used to assess normal 
distribution of the data. Descriptive statistics were obtained for demographic and 
clinical information. Independent sample t- and Mann-Whitney non-parametric test 
were applied to neuropsychological measures to explore differences between the  
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groups. A 2x2 repeated-measures ANOVA was applied to the JAAM primary outcome 
measures to assess group differences over time.  
 
Results 
 
Table 1: Demographic information of sample (n=20) 
 
  Mean/Median (SD) 
Gender- Male (%)  71.4% 
Age (years)  48.5 (9.99) 
Education (years)  13.10 (3.17) 
Handedness- Right (%)  95.2% 
Time since injury (months)  93.6 (100.81) 
Estimated post-traumatic amnesia (months)  49.00 (51.77) 
 
Two-way independent sample t-tests were applied to parametric clinical and 
demographic data (see table 2). There were no significant differences observed between 
the groups according to Age (t (18)= 0.356, p=0.726), Years in Education (t (18)= -0.241, 
p=0.812), Duration of Post-traumatic amnesia (t (18)= 1.451, p=0.164), HADS Anxiety 
scores (t (18)= 0.877, p=0.392), Matrix Reasoning scaled score (t (18)= 0.155, p=0.879), 
Logical Memory Delayed scaled scores (t (18)= -1.879, p=0.077), Trail-Making Test A (t 
(18)= 1.007, p=0.327), and WTAR Estimated premorbid IQ scores (t (18)= -0.160, 
p=0.127). 
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Figure 1: Flow Diagram of participant recruitment and allocation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significant group differences were observed on HADS Depression scores (t (18)= 2.043, 
p=0.056), Logical Memory Delayed scaled scores (t (18)= -2.133, p=0.047), SDMT scores 
(t (18)= -2.654, p=0.016), Self-rated PRMQ Total scores (t (18)= 3.06, p=0.007), Self-rated 
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PRMQ Prospective memory scores (t (18)= 2.892, p=0.01), Self-rated PRMQ 
Retrospective Memory scores (t (18)= 3.099, p=0.006), Other-rated PRMQ Total Scores 
(t (18)= 3.06, p=0.013), Other-rated PRMQ Prospective Memory scores (t (18)= 2.820, 
p=0.011), and Other-rated PRMQ Retrospective Memory scores (t (18)= 2.541, p=0.02). 
 
Table 2: Demographic and clinical information of intervention groups 
 
  Intervention (n=11)  Control (n=9)  Statistical  
  Mean/Median (SD)  Mean/Median (SD)  significance 
Gender- Male (%)  81.8%  60%  n/s 
Gender- Female (%)  18.2%  40%  n/s 
Age (years)  46.9 (9.62)  49.8 (10.62)  n/s 
Education (years)  13.09 (2.11)  13.10 (4.17)  n/s 
Handedness (R)  90.9%  100%  n/s 
Time since injury 
(months) 
 
101.82 (116.18) 
 
82.60 (86.08) 
 
n/s 
Estimated PTA 
(months) 
 
63.5 (66.70) 
 
29.89 (20.53) 
 
n/s 
Injury type (TBI, CVA, 
Haemorrhage) 
 
8, 1, 2 
 
7, 0, 3 
 
- 
Psychiatric diagnosis 
(%) 
 
18.1% 
 
10% 
n/s 
HADS- Depression 
(/21) 
 
9.73 (4.17) 
 
6.11 (3.62) 
 
p<0.05 
HADS- Anxiety (/21)  11.09 (5.32)  9.00 (5.29)  n/s 
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  Intervention (n=11)  Control (n=9)  Statistical  
  Mean/Median (SD)  Mean/Median (SD)  significance 
HADS- Depression 
(/21) 
 
9.73 (4.17) 
 
6.11 (3.62) 
 
p<0.05 
HADS- Anxiety (/21)  11.09 (5.32)  9.00 (5.29)  n/s 
PRMQ- Prospective 
(Patient) 
 
30.73 (6.39) 
 
22.11 (6.92) 
p<0.05 
PRMQ-Retrospective 
(Patient) 
 
30.09 (5.79) 
 
20.89 (7.51) 
p<0.05 
PRMQ- Total (Patient)  60.82 (12.02)  43.00 (14.07)           p<0.05 
PRMQ- Prospective 
(Other) 
30.18 (7.57)  21.78 (5.22)          p<0.05 
PRMQ- Retrospective 
(Other) 
27.45 (7.63)  20.56 (3.05)          p<0.05 
PRMQ- Total (Other)  57.64 (14.99)  42.33 (8.00)          p<0.05 
Rey (Immediate)  30.55 (18.16)  38.7 (13.97)  n/s 
Rey (Delayed)  28.46 (14.83)  34.00 (43.80)  n/s 
Matrix Reasoning  9.82 (1.78)  9.67 (2.51)  n/s 
Logical Memory- I  6.55 (2.66)  9.22 (2.95)  p<0.05 
Logical Memory- II  6.36 (3.26)  9.33 (3.81)  n/s 
SDMT (z-score)  -2.82 (0.90)  -1. 67 (1.03)  p<0.05 
Estimated IQ (WTAR)  93.18 (10.72)  102.44 (15.16)  n/s 
Trails- A (secs)   59.27 (23.00)  50.33 (14.74)  n/s 
Trails- B (secs)  147.91 (94.69)  132.50 (82.90)  n/s  
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Non-parametric statistics (Mann-Whitney) were applied to data which was not normally 
distributed. There were no significant differences observed between the groups 
according to Time since Injury, Rey Complex Figure Immediate Recall, Rey Complex 
Figure Delayed Recall, Trail Making Test B, and Tower Test Total Achievement Score. 
 
Two-way repeated measures ANOVAs were applied to the primary outcome measures 
to assess for treatment effects according to intervention group. Sphericity was assessed 
using Mauchly’s test, with this assumption found to be violated for all JAAM variables.  
In view of this, as well as the small sample size in the present study, lower-bound 
corrections were applied to analyses. There was a significant main effect for JAAM Total 
Score for time (f(1,18)= 10.21, p=0.005, µ
2= 0.362), but not intervention group (f(1,18)= 
2.65, p=0.121, µ
2= 0.128), and there was no interaction effect (f(1,18)= 0.74, p=0.788, 
µ
2= 0.004). There were no significant main effects for JAAM Planning Score for time 
(f(1,18)= 0.16, p=0.69, µ
2= 0.09) and intervention group (f(1,18)= 0.53, p=0.48, µ
2= 0.29), 
and no interaction effect (f(1,18)= 0.16, p=0.69, µ
2= 0.09). There was a significant main 
effect for JAAM Prospective Memory Score for time (f(1,18)= 8.93, p=0.008, µ
2= 0.33), 
and intervention group (f(1,18)= 4.65, p=0.045, µ
2= 0.205), but no interaction effect 
(f(1,18)= 0.28, p=0.602, µ
2= 0.015).  
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Table 3- Mean scores for JAAM outcome measure according to intervention group. 
 
    Time 1 
Mean/ Median (SD) 
Time 2 
Mean/ Median (SD) 
 
JAAM Total 
 
GMT + II  14.55 (4.61)  17.18 (4.67) 
 
Time-controlled  18.11 (4.94)  20.33 (5.43) 
 
JAAM Planning 
 
GMT + II  6.00 (1.61)  6.00 (1.18) 
 
Time-controlled  6.56 (1.13)  6.33 (1.94) 
 
JAAM Prospective 
Memory 
 
GMT + II  3.27 (2.24)  5.18 (2.23) 
 
Time-controlled  5.56 (1.94)  6.89 (3.06) 
 
Post-hoc power analysis indicated that the present study was underpowered to detect 
an effect on the interaction of JAAM Total (0.058), Planning (0.067) and Prospective 
Memory scores (0.79). 
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Figure 2- Graph of change in Total JAAM score according to intervention group.  
 
 
Additional analysis was carried out on the separate action-, event- and time-based 
Prospective Memory measures. There were no significant main effects for Action-based 
PM scores for time (f(1,18)= 0.36, p=0.852, µ
2=0.002), intervention group (f(1,18)= 
3.473, p=0.079, µ
2=0.162), or interaction (f(1,18)= 0.36, p=0.852, µ
2=0.002). There was a 
significant main effect for Event-based PM scores for time (f(1,18)= 10.581, p=0.004, 
µ
2=0.370), but not group intervention (f(1,18)= 0.397, p=0.536, µ
2=0.022) or interaction 
(f(1,18)= 0.25, p=0.623, µ
2=0.014). There was a significant main effect for Time-based 
PM scores for time (f(1,18)= 8.839, p=0.008, µ
2=0.329) and group intervention (f(1,18)= 
5.479, p=0.31, µ
2=0.233), but no interaction effect (f(1,18)= 0.354, p=0.559, µ
2=0.019). 
 
Removal’s Task scores were analysed using independent samples tests (Mann-Whitney 
and Student’s t-test). The results indicate that there were no significant differences  
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between the groups on Strategy Score (t (17)= 0.497, p= 0.622) and rule following 
(Intrusion 1, p<0.05; Intrusion 2, p<0.05). 
 
Figure 3- Graph of change in JAAM Prospective Memory subscale score according to 
intervention group. 
 
In view of the significant group differences on various clinical tests and baseline JAAM 
performance (i.e. HADS Depression, Logical Memory Delayed, SDMT; Trail-Making Test 
B, and PRMQ questionnaire scores), these variables were included as covariates in 
further repeated-measures ANOVAs. However, their inclusion did not alter the 
conclusion regarding the effectiveness of the intervention. 
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Discussion 
 
This study sought to assess the efficacy of a training intervention to improve prospective 
memory in those with acquired brain injury. It was hypothesised that those receiving 
combined GMT and implementation intention training would perform significantly 
better on the JAAM measures of prospective memory and executive function than those 
allocated to combined GMT and control imagery intervention. The results of the 
analysis- as evidenced by the lack of interaction effect- do not support this hypothesis. 
Although significant differences were observed between the two groups on baseline 
clinical variables, inclusion of these variables as covariates in the analysis did not 
influence the observed treatment effect. Furthermore, no significant were differences 
identified between the two groups on the Removals Task secondary outcome measure. 
Post-hoc power analysis indicates that the result would not be altered by the 
recruitment of additional participants. 
 
The apparent failure of the randomisation process is notable, not only because it 
constitutes a significant aspect of the design, but also because of the implications it may 
have for an observed effect.   The use of blocked- randomisation aimed to reduce the 
probability of this occurring, and discussion between researchers identified no evidence 
that concealment was violated. One explanation for the observed inequalities is that the 
‘block’ recruitment from sites contained more severely impaired participants, and this 
may have exacerbated the influence of any naturally occurring distortions in allocation  
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process. However, there is no evidence that certain sites contained significantly more 
impaired participants. Unequal group allocation and disparities in symptom severity do 
occur in the clinical trials (e.g. Morrison, French, Walford, Lewis, Kilcommons et al., 
2004) and while it represents a methodological limitation, is also a foreseeable outcome 
of any randomisation process. 
 
These issues notwithstanding, some significant differences were observed, with a 
significant effect of time on the JAAM Total and Prospective Memory scores (specifically 
event- and time-based prospective memory); however, it is unclear to what extent 
these improvements in performance represent practice effects or are the result of 
successful use of the GMT training strategy. Lezak, Howieson & Loring (2004; pp. 116) 
report that practice effects are more common in tests that have a “large speeded 
component, require an unfamiliar or practiced mode of response, or have a single 
solution- particularly if it can be easily conceptualized once it is attained”. The latter two 
criteria are certainly applicable to the JAAM task, and may increase the likelihood that 
improved performance is attributable to practice. Alternatively, improvements could 
have derived from the GMT intervention received by both groups, which is designed to 
improve planning and problem-solving. Although this is a possibility, it is unclear why 
there was no improvement to JAAM Planning scores as would have been expected with 
this training strategy. However, in the absence of a third control group (receiving no 
intervention at all), firm conclusions on this issue are not possible. 
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However, this introduces the issue of how the control imagery intervention may have 
exerted influence in this study. This type of control condition is believed to have a subtly 
different mode of influence than that of a traditional placebo, which in the context of 
psychological interventions control for the non-specific factors known to exert a positive 
influence on treatment effect (e.g. therapeutic relationship). The purpose of the present 
control intervention was to ensure that participants experienced similar length of 
intervention and to provide some kind of purposeful cognitive task to engage in. 
However, it remains unclear whether the use of imagery in the present exercise may 
have reduced any effect sizes that may have occurred, by potentially exerting an 
influence through motivational factors. 
 
Certainly, the lack of treatment effect in the present study is contrary to the findings 
observed in other examinations of Implementation Intentions. Other investigators have 
found this mnemonic strategy to be effective in improving prospective remembering in 
a variety of different contexts, including breast self-examination (Prestwich et al. 2005) 
and blood- glucose monitoring (Liu & Park, 2004). However, in contrast to the 
participants in the present study, Prestwich et al. (2005) and Liu & Park (2004) looked at 
the effect of Implementation Intentions in neurotypical adults. More valid comparison 
may be found with studies exploring the effect of implementation intentions in 
neurologically-impaired participants. 
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Kardiasmenos et al. (2008) found that patients with Multiple Sclerosis improved on an 
ecologically-valid measure of prospective memory task when using an implementation 
intention-based strategy. Cognitive impairments are associated with MS, although their 
presence is highly variable, with a significant proportion (34%-46%) exhibiting no 
observable impairment (Lezak et al., 2004; pp. 250). It is unclear how cognitively 
impaired Kardiasmenos et al.’s participants actually were, as they did not conduct 
background clinical assessments. Their sample had a substantially higher estimated 
premorbid IQ (115) than the present intervention group (93), which is suggestive of 
their sample being less impaired. In addition, participants received constant feedback on 
their application of the strategy throughout the task, in contrast to the participants in 
this study. Alternatively, Lengfelder & Gollwitzter (2001) recruited participants with 
frontal-lobe brain injury, and found that implementation intentions-based training was 
effective at improving performance on a dual-tasking paradigm. Their sample possessed 
significant cognitively impairment, and was thus more similar to the present sample. 
However, the nature of their task was not only less ecologically valid, but also less 
challenging than in that used by Kardiasmenos et al. (2008). As such, the effectiveness of 
Implementation Intentions appears at least partly influenced by the interaction between 
cognitive impairment and complexity of outcome measure. 
 
This interpretation should be viewed in the context of other remedial interventions for 
prospective memory deficits. As with those examining Implementation Intentions-based 
interventions, strategies shown to improve prospective memory have predominantly  
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occurred in the context of simplified task demands. For example, Levine et al. (2000) 
found GMT to be effective at improving the quality of participants’ performances on a 
proof-reading task (underlining fruits and vegetables, crossing out liquids and circling 
numbers), of similar complexity to the dual-tasking paradigm used by Lengfelder & 
Gollwitzer (2001). Where more ecologically valid (and thus arguably more demanding) 
tasks have been used (e.g. Sweeney, Morris, Manly & Evans, 2005; Brown & Evans, in 
preparation) there is little evidence of improvement at a group level. It is possible that 
the combination of significantly impaired participants and a more challenging task 
reduces the likelihood of a treatment effect occurring, irrespective of the attributes of 
the intervention. 
 
Consideration must also be given to how intervention structure may have influenced 
participants’ ability to acquire and apply strategies. The present intervention adopted an 
errorless learning paradigm to assist with strategy acquisition. Errorless learning is an 
approach that can assist with learning even in the presence of serious memory deficits 
(Baddeley & Wilson, 1994). Errorless learning can also be used to aid procedural 
learning, including dressing oneself and programming an electronic organiser (Evans et 
al., 2000). Executive deficits are not in themselves barriers to errorless learning; Pitel, 
Beaunieux, Lebaron, Joyeux, Desgrange et al. (2006) demonstrated that amnesic 
patients with significant executive dysfunction were able to learn a procedural task 
using an errorless paradigm. However, while the programming tasks used by Evans et al. 
(2000) and Pitel et al. (2006) appear quite complex, participants were only required to  
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make approximately six button presses to be considered ‘successful’ at learning the 
sequence. It is unclear whether the effectiveness of errorless learning extends to 
procedural tasks of the complexity used in the present study, where in contrast to Evans 
et al. (2000) and Pitel et al. (2006), participants were required to remember eight 
procedural commands, which were then to be used during unstructured problem-
solving.  
 
Another issue is that Pitel et al.’s (2006) participants took 5½ - 7 hours to acquire these 
sequences, a time far exceeding that available to participants in the present study (45- 
60 minutes). The influence of intervention duration has been explored by Kennedy, 
Coelho, Turkstra, Ylvisaker, Sohlberg et al. (2008), who carried out a systematic review 
of interventions for executive function after traumatic brain injury. They noted that the 
average amount of time spent in treatment was 12 hours spread over several weekly 
sessions (Kennedy et al., 2008), and that there were substantial differences in treatment 
duration, lasting from 30 minutes (e.g. Manly et al., 2001) to 48 hours (e.g. Rath, Simon, 
Langenbahn, Sherr & Diller, 2003; Kennedy et al., 2008). Successful brief interventions 
(e.g. Manly et al., 2001; Fish et al., 2007) typically required participants to respond to a 
discrete stimulus (e.g. text messages saying ‘STOP’) with a restricted range of responses. 
There is no necessary relationship between treatment duration and effectiveness 
(Kennedy et al., 2008), although one appears to exist between the length of treatment 
and the complexity of the behaviour to be performed. The relatively short training time 
available for subjects in this study may have contributed to the lack of observed effect.  
  80
 
However, in contrast to the factors influencing training acquisition, it was observed that 
participants had difficulty applying strategies, something that may be more closely 
related to the nature of their deficits. Shallice & Burgess’ (1996) model of executive 
function proposes that development and implementation of a temporary behavioural 
schema during problem-solving has several components: (1) Problem- orientation; (2) 
Goal setting; (3) Progressive deepening; (4) Solution checking; (5) Special purpose 
working memory; and (6) Monitoring of the schema. Episodic memory is also implicated 
in this process, allowing for comparison with similar problems in the past, while 
contention-scheduling influences the extent to which a schema is used in future. 
Assuming that a participant has encoded the training strategies, schema use may break 
down at one of several points: inadequate analysis of the problem; selection of 
inappropriate schema as a solution; impaired use of autobiographical memory to guide 
schema selection; or dysfunctional contention-scheduling. 
 
Successful strategy application may in many ways reflect the demands a strategy places 
on higher-order functions, and how well training scaffolds these cognitive demands. As 
was noted earlier, while Implementation Intentions are in their basic form conceptually 
quite simple (“when I see x, I will do y”), they may difficult for those with cognitive 
impairment to apply. Thus, for Implementation Intentions to be effective during 
unstructured problem solving, participants may require a significantly longer and more 
supported training which addresses a broader range of problems. Indirect support for  
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this is provided by Kardiasmenos et al. (2008) whose participants were provided with 
regular prompts to use the strategy over several ‘rounds’ of the task. Noticeable 
improvement (according to visual analysis of performance) was only achieved towards 
the final rounds of the task, potentially reflecting the cumulative effect of training. 
 
A final issue relates to the study design used to assess the effectiveness of this remedial 
strategy. Randomised controlled trials (RCT) are considered to be the ‘gold standard’ for 
assessing the effectiveness of clinical interventions (Altman, Schulz, Moher, Egger, 
Davidoff et al., 2001). Among the important assumptions that allow them to make 
causal inferences about a treatment are those of homogeneity of pathology and 
equivalence of effect. Homogeneity means that the same pathological process is 
believed to underlie the disease in all cases (regardless of how patients differ in terms of 
other demographic or medical factors); equivalence means that disease change is 
inferred to be a product (directly or indirectly) of changes made to that pathological 
process. Both of these factors are a necessary to ensure that one is seeing the ‘true 
effect’ of an intervention. For example, (assuming certain methodological conditions are 
met) an RCT looking at the effect of cefotaxine on meningococcal meningitis assesses 
the ‘true’ effect of this intervention. This is because meningococcal meningitis is 
understood to always be caused by the same bacterial infection of the meninges 
(homogeneity). Antibiotics (cefotaxine) kill these bacteria and should (directly or 
indirectly) reduce the severity of disease (equivalence). However, any study looking at 
the effect of cefotaxine on ‘meningitis’ would be unlikely to assess the true effect of the  
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treatment because this violates homogeneity and equivalence (meningitis can be caused 
by bacteria, viral, fungal or parasitic infections), and treatment only acts on one of 
several possible pathological processes.  
 
The assumptions of homogeneity and equivalence are problematic in the context of 
neuropsychological impairments because similar behavioural pathology (e.g. deficits in 
prospective memory), may result from different aetiological pathways (Cubelli & Della 
Sala, 2011). As such, any response to treatment (or lack thereof) cannot logically be 
assumed to result from the amelioration (or failure thereof) of the targeted modality. 
Thus while prospective memory is traditionally conceived as an attentional process (e.g. 
Burgess et al., 2007), deficits in it cannot be assumed to result from damage to 
attentional systems. For example, patients with dense, anterograde amnesia may 
experience deficits in prospective memory because they unable to encode intentions, 
while they may be unable to use rehabilitation strategies for similar reasons. In this 
situation, treatment effect could be reduced or absent, independent of any specific 
qualities of the intervention. These issues are tacitly acknowledged in most RCT trial 
methodologies; exclusion criteria frequently include those factors known to exert a 
significant indirect negative influence on treatment effects (e.g. old age, drug abuse; 
serious psychiatric illness). However, attempts to apply similar standards with respect to 
influential cognitive moderators in brain injured samples would likely prove 
problematic. Any such exclusion criteria would be highly restrictive, producing  
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unfeasibly small samples, limiting the generalizability of results, and providing little 
information about the reasons for treatment failure. 
 
It is argued that a more practical and ecologically-valid methodology involves the use of 
neuropsychological and formulation-driven assessment to “account for the observed 
patterns of spared and impaired abilities in terms of damage to one or more 
components of a theory or model of normal cognition” (pp.36; Cubelli & Della Sala, 
2011; cf. Ellis & Young, 1995).  Subsequent allocation of ‘ideal’ and contraindicated 
cases (according to formulation) to blinded treatment could allow for comparison of 
treatment effect. As such, clinical case series designs (e.g. O’Neill, Moran & Gillespie, 
2010) may more faithful to the principles of clinical neuropsychology, and more 
appropriate when exploring the impact of neuropsychological interventions. 
 
Limitations 
This study contained a number of limitations. The choice of a single-blinded 
methodology was a practical consideration, but it nonetheless represents a potential 
source of bias in psychological therapy outcome studies (Wilkes et al., 2007). A related 
issue is that the scoring of the JAAM outcome measure involves a degree of personal 
judgement from the assessor, and despite attempts to standardise marking, this could 
further increase bias within the study. However, one issue for this study relates to the 
estimate of the sample size required for adeqaute power. To carry out this calculation, 
the effect size of the interaction term from  the ANOVA in Kardiasmenos et al. (2008)  
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was drawn upon to estimate the effect size in the present study (albeit the anticipated 
effect size was consevative compared to the Kardiasmenos et al. result). An alternative 
approach to analysis may have been to focus on between group differences in mean 
change scores. If the analysis was a simple between group difference test then a sample 
size estimate would have indicated a considerably larger sample size would have been 
required. 
 
Although there is no specific reason to consider that the participants recruited were not 
representative of the wider population (i.e. no reason to suspect that the effect size 
would have been any larger with a larger group) it remains possible that the relatively 
small sample size meant that the participants were not in fact representative of the 
wider population and a larger sample would have resulted in a larger group x time 
interaction (or larger between group difference in mean change score). Furthermore, 
with a larger sample the randomisation procedure may have been more effective in 
producing groups which were equal in terms of impairment which may have impacted 
on likely benefit from the intervention in relation to the primary outcome measure (the 
JAAM task).Finally, there is the potential for sampling bias, in that clinical staff recruited 
those patients they felt would like to be involved in the study. As such, this may have 
biased sampling towards more motivated individuals or those with less antisocial 
behaviour.  
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Generalizability  
Despite these limitations, the present study has a number of strengths in terms of 
generalizability. It sampled a broad clinical population (ABI), while the demographic 
composition of the sample in terms of gender and socio-economic status is broadly 
similar to that seen in clinical practice. However, the small sample size limits the 
application of these results to the wider population of brain-injured patients. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, Implementation Intentions combined with GMT did not significantly 
improve performance on measures of executive functioning and prospective memory 
over that of a control intervention. Possible influences on this include the severity and 
nature of participants’ impairments, the structure, duration and intensity of training, 
and the methodology adopted to investigate this topic. 
 
Clinical and empirical implications 
The small observed effect sizes suggest that recruitment of a larger sample alone would be 
unlikely to alter the present findings. The influence of other variables (e.g. nature and 
severity of deficits, complexity of desired strategy) means that any future intervention 
should be more intensive and supportive than in the present study, as well as containing 
a wider range of behavioural exemplars to aid generalisation. This may in part be 
accomplished with the adoption of shorter testing sessions, something linked with more  
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selective use of background measures to characterise the sample. The use of a clinical 
case series design would allow both for assessment of intervention effectiveness under 
‘ideal’ circumstances, but also for exploration the relative influence of the relevant 
neuropsychological mechanisms in determining intervention outcome.  
 
While there is currently insufficient evidence to consider Implementation Intentions to 
be an evidence-based intervention in this clinical population, the relative balance of 
risks and benefits suggests that this should not necessarily preclude its usage. A key 
issue relates to those described earlier regarding whether the intervention is sufficiently 
intensive or provides adequate support to aid strategy acquisition. The issue then arises 
as to whether- in the absence of compelling evidence- this represents an effective use of 
resources. 
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Abstract 
 
This reflective account primarily considers my considerations of ethical issues over the 
course of their training as well as the role of ethical conduct itself. It includes my 
recognition that even ethical issues that appear embedded within a specific clinical 
scenario or incident are themselves a consequence of a wide-ranging number of issues, 
not immediately associated with that event. These include issues such as the paradigms 
used to devise both ‘pure’ and treatment evidence within the research literature, and 
how these relate to the skills and values held by our profession as Clinical Psychologists. 
Furthermore, I consider the way in less specific skills developed throughout training can 
assist in my resolution of personal concerns, despite the difficulties inherent in 
challenging one’s own beliefs. 
 
 
 
 
Full chapter bound separately in Volume 2  
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Abstract 
This account charts the development of my thoughts in relation to carrying out research 
as a clinical psychologist. Through this process I have explored my own emotional 
reactions, moving on to consider the change from the role of a trainee to that of a 
qualified clinician, including the shifting balance of idealism to pragmatism. Through this 
reflection I have been encouraged to explore different methods of utilising the research 
skills that I have developed through my clinical training. Importantly, I have reflected on 
the influence of socio-political factors regarding how research is used in clinical practice, 
both in terms of execution and consumption of empirical study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Full chapter bound separately in Volume 2  
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Appendix 1- Systematic Review 
1.1    Guidelines for submission to “Neuropsychological 
Rehabilitation” 
Submission of manuscripts: 
 
Typescripts. The style and format of the typescripts should conform to the specifications given 
in the Publication Manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.). Typescripts 
should be double spaced with adequate margins, and numbered throughout. The title page of 
an article should contain only: 
 
(1) the title of the paper, the name(s) and address(es) of the author(s); 
(2) a short title not exceeding 40 letters and spaces, which will be used for page headlines; 
(3) name and address of the author to whom correspondence and proofs should be sent; 
(4) your telephone, fax and e-mail numbers, as this helps speed of processing considerably.  
(5) 3-5 keywords  
Abstract. An abstract of 50-200 words should follow the title page on a separate page. 
Headings. Indicate headings and subheadings for different sections of the paper clearly. Do not 
number headings. 
Acknowledgements. These should be as brief as possible and typed on a separate page at the 
beginning of the text. 
Permission to quote. Any direct quotation, regardless of length, must be accompanied by a 
reference citation that includes a page number. Any quote over six manuscript lines should have 
formal written permission to quote from the copyright owner. It is the author's responsibility to 
determine whether permission is required from the copyright owner and, if so, to obtain it. (See 
"Seeking permission to use other sources" for a template letter to use when seeking copyright 
permission.)  
Footnotes. These should be avoided unless absolutely necessary. Essential footnotes should be 
indicated by superscript figures in the text and collected on a separate page at the end of the 
manuscript. 
 
References: 
 
Reference citations within the text. Use authors' last names, with the year of publication, e.g., 
“(Brown, 1982; Jones & Smith, 1987; White, Johnson, & Thomas, 1990)”. On first citation of 
references with three to five authors, give all names in full, thereafter use [first author] “et al.”.  
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In the references, the first six authors should be listed in full. 
 
If more than one article by the same author(s) in the same year is cited, the letters a, b, c, etc., 
should follow the year. If a paper is in preparation, submitted, or under review, the reference 
should include the authors, the title, and the year of the draft (the paper should also be cited 
throughout the paper using the year of the draft). Manuscripts that are “in press” should also 
include the publisher or journal, and should substitute “in press” for the date. 
 
Reference list. A full list of references quoted in the text should be given at the end of the paper 
in alphabetical order of authors' surnames (or chronologically for a group of references by the 
same authors), commencing as a new page, typed double spaced. Titles of journals and books 
should be given in full, e.g.: 
 
Books:  
Rayner, E., Joyce, A., Rose, J., Twyman, M., & Clulow, C. (2008). Human development: An 
introduction to the psychodynamics of growth, maturity and ageing (4th ed.). Hove, UK: 
Routledge.  
 
Chapter in edited book:  
Craik, F. I. M., Naveh-Benjamin, M., & Anderson, N. D. (1998). Encoding processes: Similarities 
and differences. In M. A. Conway, S. E. Gathercole, & C. Cornoldi (Eds.), Theories of memory (Vol. 
2, pp. 61–86). Hove, UK: Psychology Press.  
 
Journal article:  
Adlington, R. L., Laws, K. R., & Gale, T. M. (2009). The Hatfield Image Test (HIT): A new picture 
test and norms for experimental and clinical use. Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Neuropsychology, 31, 731-753. doi:10.1080/13803390802488103 
 
Tables. These should be kept to the minimum. Each table should be typed double spaced on a 
separate page, giving the heading, e.g., "Table 2", in Arabic numerals, followed by the legend, 
followed by the table. Make sure that appropriate units are given. Instructions for placing the 
table should be given in parentheses in the text, e.g., "(Table 2 about here)".  
 
Figures.  
Figures should only be used when essential and the same data should not be presented both as 
a figure and in a table. Where possible, related diagrams should be grouped together to form a 
single figure. Each figure should be on a separate page, not integrated with the text. The figure 
captions should be typed in a separate section, headed, e.g., "Figure 2", in Arabic numerals. 
Instructions for placing the figure should be given in parentheses in the text, e.g., "(Figure 2 
about here)".  
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For more detailed guidelines see Preparation of Figure Artwork.  
Statistics. Results of statistical tests should be given in the following form:  
"... results showed an effect of group, F(2, 21) = 13.74, MSE = 451.98, p < .001, but there was no 
effect of repeated trials, F(5, 105) = 1.44, MSE = 17.70, and no interaction, F(10, 105) = 1.34, 
MSE = 17.70."  
Other tests should be reported in a similar manner to the above example of an F-ratio. For a 
fuller explanation of statistical presentation, see the APA Publication Manual (6th ed.). 
 
Abbreviations. Abbreviations that are specific to a particular manuscript or to a very specific 
area of research should be avoided, and authors will be asked to spell out in full any such 
abbreviations throughout the text. Standard abbreviations such as RT for reaction time, SOA for 
stimulus onset asynchrony or other standard abbreviations that will be readily understood by 
readers of the journal are acceptable. Experimental conditions should be named in full, except in 
tables and figures.  
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Appendix 2- Major Research Project 
2.1    JAAM: Instructions for Test Administration 
 
The testing area should be set up as shown in Figure 1. Before commencing the formal 
assessment programme, ensure that the participant is comfortable in navigating around 
a VR environment by loading the training VR programme at the outset. Ensure that the 
computer sound volume is audible since part of the task requires the participant to be 
able to hear certain alarms. Allow as much time as required for the participant to move 
within the environment; encourage the use of the mouse when navigating around in VR, 
as  this  will  free  up  the  keyboard  for  the  person  running  the  assessment  to  press 
specified keys when the formal assessment begins. This training programme has been 
specially designed so that there are a number of ‘hazards’ that have to be overcome. 
These are generally ‘health and safety’ issues such as a box having been left in the 
middle of a corridor, dangerous cables lying around, etc. The programme produces a 
sound every time one of these is encountered. Ensure that the participant knows how to 
click on these hazards, as this will allow them to develop the required skill for working 
with the formal VR assessment, e.g. to focus on selecting specific items on the screen to 
pick up, put down where they want it, etc.  
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When the participant has familiarised themselves with navigating around the training VR 
environment, move to the JAAM VR programme. Follow the script as given, answering 
any questions as required. It is important for the participant at this stage to become 
familiar  with  selecting  items  by  clicking  on them,  and then  clicking  on  the  horizontal 
surface upon which they wish to place the item. The Office that contains most of the 
participant’s paperwork is the first door on the right along the corridor and the switch for 
turning on the lights is to the right once the room has been entered. The Meeting Room 
where the participant will set up the meeting is at the end of the main corridor. It is very 
important so allow time for the participant to practice this, as otherwise items within the 
VR environment may ‘disappear’ or ‘distort’ thus adding to any initial anxiety regarding 
the use of the computer. Due to the nature of the programme, objects can sometimes 
become “lost” when the participant moves them, so that they are no longer visible. As 
the programme is not designed to test the participant’s ability to use it this will not affect 
the scoring or the participant’s performance. Apologise to the participant and explain that 
this will not affect their scoring. Ask them where they were planning to place that item of 
furniture and then continue with the programme. 
Welcome  the  participant  to  the  assessment  and  read  from  the  Script  and  Scenario, 
following the instructions in [italics]. Ensure that the participant is well-versed in the 
information given in the script and the scenario sheet – in particular the rules - before 
proceeding to start the tasks. All questions relating to the running of the assessment 
should be encouraged before the start of the assessment. 
Only  questions  relating  to  technical  aspects  of  operating  the  VR  programme,  for 
example, a reminder for how to pick items up, should be answered. If questions arise in 
relation to how to go about completing the tasks either before or during the assessment, 
the assessor should refrain from directing the actions of the participant, and refer them 
to  the  Scenario  Sheet  or  other  relevant  instructions  available  to  them.  If  it  becomes 
apparent  that  the  participant  cannot  proceed  past  a  particular  stage,  help  should  be 
provided by the assessor to enable the participant to carry on to the next stage of the 
task, and a note made on the scoring criteria that such a prompt had to be given. 
The  first  task  after  the  Script  and  Scenario  have  been  read  and  the  participant  has 
understood  the  ‘Manager’s  Tasks  for  Completion  is  for  them  to  write  their  ‘Plan  of 
Action’.  After  they  have  completed  this  first  task,  put  the  ‘Manager’s  Tasks  For 
Completion’ back in its original place on their desk so that it is not in their way, i.e. they 
will work from their ‘Plan of Action’ but they still have access to the ‘Manager’s Tasks for 
Completion’ if it is needed. Leaving it in accessible like this avoids an additional memory 
load if they do not write down all the tasks on their ‘Plan of Action’ since writing the ‘Plan 
of Action’ tests planning and is not a memory task. However the participant is informed 
in the script that they will have to work from their Plan of Action and therefore should 
write down all the tasks on this. Once the participant has finished writing the Plan of 
Action, ask if they have any questions and then press “S” to start the timings.  
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To reduce reliance on having to read documents that arrive in the virtual office from the 
screen,  hard  copies  are  available.  These  are  indicated  in  red  writing  in  the  virtual 
environment  with  the  physical  copies  being  placed  next  to  the  computer  during  the 
assessment within easy reach of the participant at the appropriate time. However, there 
are some documents, four separate memos (please see below for a list of their contents) 
that will be provided to the participant during the course of the assessment, some of 
which the participant will know about in advance while others will not be expected. When 
each memo arrives, a sound occurs on the computer stating “There is a new memo in 
your in-tray” and the memo will automatically appear in the in-tray in the small office. To 
read the memo the participant has to click on it in the in-tray and the memo will appear 
at the bottom right-hand corner of the computer screen. When the memos arrive, allow 
the participant time to read them and then pass them the paper version. If they do not 
realise  that  a  memo  has  arrived,  maybe  because  they  are  too  engrossed  in  doing 
something else, please indicate this to the participant and then write this as a qualitative 
observation  on  the  Scoring  Sheet.  If  they  have  difficulty  opening  the  memos  on  the 
virtual reality environment just use the paper copies. 
In situations where a particular participant feels that they have completed all tasks even 
though this is evidently not the case, prompts should be given to encourage them to 
undertake  remaining  tasks  in  order  that  appropriate  scores  can  be  obtained  for  the 
constructs that would otherwise be missed out; again, a note should be made on the 
scoring criteria that prompts had to be given. 
Timings of programme: 
These events all occur automatically once the start of the programme has been triggered 
by the pressing of the ‘S’ key: 
• 5 minutes – Fire Alarm (relates to TBPM) 
• 10 minutes – 1st memo (relates to Adaptive Thinking) 
• 18 minutes – 2nd memo (relates to Prioritisation) 
• 20 minutes – company postman should arrive (relates to TBPM) 
• 25 minutes – 3rd memo (relates to Selection) 
• 30 minutes – Fire Alarm (relates to TBPM) 
• 32 minutes – 4th memo (relates to EBPM) 
Memos which arrive in In-Tray 
1. From maintenance regarding leak in roof above coffee machine 
2. Jobs for cleaner to do after meeting has finished 
3. New package from Finance Department 
4. First person attending meeting has arrived  
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2.2    Examiner script for JAAM task 
 
Hello…………….. I am going to read to you from a script for purposes of continuity. I am 
going  to  explain  all  aspects  of  the  task  to  you,  however  if  you  have  any  additional 
questions please ask them at any point. 
Thank  you  for  agreeing  to  take  place  in  this  study,  which  is  investigating  how  well 
different people work in an office environment. The study takes place in a virtual reality 
environment on the computer. Do not worry if you haven’t used a computer before, clear 
instructions about how to use the virtual reality programme will be given to you. Would 
you like to practice using this type of environment before we proceed any further? [The 
participant is given the choice of using the training programme] 
I will now let you read, in your own time, the office-scenario in which the assessment will 
take place. You shall be referred to as the participant and I shall be referred to as the 
assessor throughout. [Assessor allows the participant to read the scenario in their 
own time.] 
Right, now I shall summarise this scenario for you to help you become more familiar with 
it. This will  include only information that you have just read, I will not be telling  you 
anything new.  
This  study  is  set  in  an  office,  where  you  will  be  working  as  an  assistant  within  the 
administration department of a large company. Today is your first day on the job, but 
unfortunately your manager is away so cannot oversee your work. However, they have 
left you a list of jobs they would like you to complete which will be shown to you shortly. 
There is a meeting being held today and it is your main priority to ensure that the room 
for this is set up in time, which will be 40 minutes after you start the study. I will inform 
you what the exact time will be later. The meeting is for 3 people from your branch of the 
company, and for 10 external members of the company from other branches. Your other 
main job involves making sure the post for the rest of the branch is sent, details about 
this will be provided shortly. There will also be some other time-based tasks which you 
will need to complete, details will either have been provided for you by your manager or 
other departments may send you details regarding these. Therefore there are three main 
categories of tasks for you to do; those to do with the meeting, those to do with the post, 
and extra time-based tasks. It may be useful for you to perform your tasks around these 
three categories as much as you can. 
Now I will show you around your office. To move around the environment click on these 
arrows at the top in the direction that you wish to move [enter the office]. On your desk 
you have six sheets of paper, which you also have here in hard copies [point to real-life 
copies on their desk]. These are the Manager’s Tasks For Completion, Plan of Action, 
My Notes For manager, Post Diary and Post To Be Sent, and a list of Agenda Topics 
[demonstrate  how  to  pick  them  up  and  put  them  down].  The  purpose  of  these  
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sheets of paper will become apparent soon. Please note that you are not required to 
type anything, everything that needs to be written should be done so by hand on these 
paper copies just to make things easier for you.  
Now can you please identify what other objects you have in your office [make sure they 
see  the  in-tray,  completed  tray,  desk,  computer,  overhead  projector,  filing 
cabinets, sellotape, pens]. So as you can see you have many resources, but please 
note that you do not have to use them all if you do not think it is necessary. Also you can 
only use the resources that you can see in the office. 
Now I will show you the room where the meeting is going to take place. The room has 
already been booked so you do not need to do this [take them into the meeting room]. 
Please can you identify all the objects in here, feel free to move around the room using 
the arrows if you wish. [Make sure they identify the coffee machine, the bin, the 
overhead projector, the 10 tables and stools, the blackboard, the fixed whiteboard 
and graffiti, the portable whiteboard and the 3 table and chairs at the front of the 
room]. Please note that these 3 tables and chairs which are for the internal members of 
staff to use [point to tables and chairs at the front of the room] and this table which 
the coffee machine is on [point to table] are fixed and therefore cannot be moved. The 
tables and stools at the back of the room, however, can be moved. What you need to do 
in the meeting room will become apparent once you have read the Manager’s Tasks For 
Completion. 
Let’s go back into your office and then we can see what tasks your manager has left for 
you  to  do  [Go  back  into  their  office  and  hand  them  the  Manager’s  Tasks  for 
Completion sheet]. These are your tasks, which your manager has written in a random 
order. Please can you read this list out loud, I will fill in all the blank times just before the 
study starts [Participant reads them out loud; give any help or further explanations 
if needed]. OK now in your own time please group these tasks on the action plan in the 
order that you will do them; this should be in the most logical order possible. This list will 
be taken away from you later so please write as much information as you think you will 
need to do the tasks on the Plan of Action. 
Do you have any questions? This time shown on the clock is 11:00am [indicate to the 
clock on the desk], which means that the company postman should arrive at 11:20am 
and  the  meeting  should  start  in  40  minutes  at  11:40am.  You  may  begin  your  tasks 
[press “S” to start the programme at same time as starting the clock].  
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2.3  JAAM Scoring Criteria for Planning and Prospective Memory Tasks* 
START TIME:    REQUIRED END TIME:        ACTUAL END TIME: 
 
Construct  Task  Requirements  Points  Qualitative Observations 
Planning 
Write plan of 
action (6) 
Plan of action is written out taking into account all tasks  2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TIME SPENT ACTION 
PLANNING 
Plan of action is written out, omitting up to 25% of tasks  1 
Plan of action written briefly, omitting more than 25% of tasks  0 
All events regarding meeting placed together, post tasks placed together, and 
time-based tasks placed together – 10% leeway  2 
Only events regarding meeting placed together, other haphazard OR more than 
10% leeway  1 
No change/very little change from order on manager’s tasks  0 
Task completed in acceptable completion time  2 
Task completed in an unsatisfactorily long time  1 
Failure to complete task  0 
Arrange 
furniture for 
meeting (4) 
All external members of the meeting can see the whiteboard  2 
PLAN OF FURNITURE 
 
 
 
 
 
TIME SPENT ACTION 
PLANNING 
25% of the external members cannot see the whiteboard or 25% have their backs 
to the internal members of the meeting  1 
The chairs and stools are in a totally random arrangement  0 
Task completed in acceptable completion time  2 
Task completed in an unsatisfactorily long time  1 
Failure to complete task  0 
Action-based 
Prospective 
Memory 
Update the 
post diary 
when new 
package needs 
to be send (2) 
The new parcel is added to the post diary immediately  2 
 
The new parcel is added to the post list but at a later date, i.e. after checking the 
action plan at the end of the task, OR written on “Notes for Manager” 
1 
The post diary is not updated  0 
Record if any of 
the equipment 
breaks (2) 
It is recorded on the “Notes for Manager” when the OHP breaks  2 
 
It is recorded on the “Action Plan” when the OHP breaks, or only after referring to 
the “Action Plan” 
1 
Nothing is written down  0 
Event-based 
Prospective 
Memory 
Note the times 
of the fire 
alarms (2) 
Both alarms are recorded on the “Notes for Manager”  2 
TIMES OF FIRE ALARM 
Only 1 alarm is recorded, they are written on the “Action Plan” or are written only 
after referring to the “Action Plan”  
1 
None of the times are recorded  0 
Turn on coffee 
machine when 
Turn on the coffee machine after the memo arrives without referring to the 
“Action Plan” 
2 
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the first person 
arrives (2)  Turn on the coffee machine after referring to the “Action Plan”  1 
The coffee machine is not turned on, or it is turned on before the memo from 
reception arrives 
0 
Time-based 
Prospective 
Memory 
Turn on 
projector 10 
minutes before 
the meeting 
starts (2) 
Turn on projector at exact time  2 
 
Turn on projector but not at designated time  1 
Never turn on the projector  0 
Indicate 
whether the 
company 
postman has 
arrived (2) 
Write down that the company postman has not arrived and be aware that the 
post must be sent another way 
2 
 
It is nor recorded that the company postman has not arrived but the post is sent 
another way 
1 
Do not notice that the company postman has not arrived to take the post  0 
* Adapted from JAAM Manual (Jansari, 2009)  
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2.4    Participant Information Sheet 
 
 
 
 
 
Participant information sheet 
Rehabilitation of Prospective Memory [B] 
 
Purpose of this study 
 
This study aims to test whether a treatment for memory problems following brain injury 
is effective. It looks at a particular kind of memory called 'prospective memory'; this is 
the memory for things you need to do in the future. For example, if you need to 
remember to take medication at a certain time or phone a friend. Many people have 
problems with these kinds of tasks after they have experienced a brain injury. 
 
If I decide to take part, what will happen? 
 
You will already have completed two assessment sessions in an earlier study. You will be 
asked  to  attend  one  session  at  the  same  location  where  this  testing  is  carried  out. 
Where  possible  this  will  be  at  the  NHS  or  voluntary  organisation  where  you  were 
recruited from. It is not possible to only participate in the treatment session. 
 
This  session  will  last  a  maximum  of  2  ½  hours.  First,  you  will  be  randomly  placed  nto  an 
intervention group. This intervention will last about 1 hour and will get you practicing skills and 
techniques to help you with your memory, using things like imagery and other strategies known 
to help people with brain injury. After that you will get a short break. Finally you will complete 
two computer tests similar to ones you did before, where you can practice these skills. 
 
Research methods 
 
This is an intervention study, which means it looks at the whether a treatment works or not. It 
compares two groups; one group who receive the full treatment, another group that receives a 
treatment that isn't expected to work (a 'placebo' treatment). People are randomly placed in 
one of these groups. This study is also 'blinded', which means that you would not know whether 
you are receiving the full or placebo treatment. This kind of study means that you are not able 
to pick which group you will be in, and the experimenter will not be able to tell you. Therefore, it 
is possible that you will not be in the 'full treatment ' group, but believe that you are. However, 
even if you do not receive the full treatment at this stage, you will still have the chance later on, 
if the study shows it to be effective. 
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Why have I been chosen? 
 
This study looks at people who have problems with prospective memory following a brain injury. 
You,  someone  you  know  or  earlier  assessment  has  suggested  that  you  may  experience 
difficulties with this. 
 
Do I have to take part? 
 
No. It is entirely optional whether or not you take part. If you decide not to take part, this will 
have no impact on the care or treatment you receive in the NHS. 
 
Are there any disadvantages to taking part in this study? 
 
The tests we will use are meant to be challenging. This means that people can find them quite 
tiring to complete. 
  
As was mentioned earlier, you may be given the ineffective 'placebo' treatment, but not know it 
until after the study. This can cause some people to feel that they have been misled. This is a 
possibility, but it is not our intention to cause distress. The decision to 'blind' a study is an 
important part of making this research useful. You can discuss your feelings with any of the 
people detailed at the end of this information sheet. 
 
What are the possible benefits to taking part in this study? 
 
It is hoped that if you continue to use the skills learned during the intervention, this will help 
improve your prospective memory (e.g. remembering to pass a message onto a friend when you 
see them). Both the full treatment and placebo groups will receive treatment if this is found to 
be effective. In this way, you will receive the best treatment available regardless of which group 
you are in. Even if this is not the case, this study will still lead to new knowledge to help others 
with brain injury and these types of memory problems. 
 
What alternative treatments could I get? 
 
There are a limited number of treatments available for this type of memory problem. This study 
combines the only other effective training treatment with a newer approach using imagery.  
 
Will you contact my GP? 
 
With your permission, we will send your GP a short letter to let them know that you are taking 
part in the study. If you would like to see an example of the standard letter that we would be 
sending, please just ask a member of the study team. 
 
What kinds of expenses or costs can I claim? 
 
You will not be paid to take part in this study. 
 
Who has reviewed this study? 
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This study has been reviewed by the Department of Psychological Medicine at the University of 
Glasgow; NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde Research and Development Department; and the NHS 
Greater  Glasgow  &  Clyde  Ethics  Committee.  They  have  approved  it  to  begin  recruiting 
participants. 
 
Who is organising and funding this research? 
 
This study is being conducted to fulfill the requirements for the Doctorate in Clinical Psychology 
and the Doctorate of Philosophy (PhD) in Psychological Medicine at the University of Glasgow. It 
is being conducted by Trainee Clinical Psychologists Andrew Wood and Fiona Scott, and PhD 
student  Satu  Baylan.  It  is  being  supervised  by  Professor  Jon  Evans  at  the  Department  of 
Psychological  Medicine  (University  of  Glasgow).  Financial  support  is  being  provided  by  the 
University  of  Glasgow,  NHS  Greater  Glasgow  &  Clyde  and  the  Sackler  Institute  of 
Psychobiological Research. 
What if I decide I want to drop out? 
 
You can decide to withdraw from the study at any point. You do not have to give a reason. It will 
have no impact on the quality of the care you receive. 
 
If I have any further questions? 
 
If you would like more information or would like to receive a summary of the main findings once 
the study has completed, please contact: 
 
Andrew Wood or Fiona Scott 
(Trainee Clinical Psychologists)  
Section of Psychological Medicine, 
Gartnavel Royal Hospital, 1055 Great 
Western Road, Glasgow, G21 OXH.      
Tel. 075 3646 6149  
E-mail: f.scott.1@research.gla.ac.uk or 
a.wood.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
        Satu Baylan 
(PhD Student)  
Sackler Institute of Psychobiological 
Research, Southern General Hospital, 
Glasgow, G51 4TF.  
Tel. 0141 232 7566  
E-mail: s.baylan@clinmed.gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
If you would like to contact someone, who 
is  not  directly  involved  in  the  study,  for 
general  advise  about  taking  part  in 
research, please contact Dr Denyse Kersel, 
Clinical  Director,  Community  Treatment 
Centre for brain Injury,  on 0141 300 6313 
or via email:  
denyse.kersel@ggc.scot.nhs.uk. 
 
 
 
Thank you for taking the time to read 
this information.  
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2.5    Participant Consent Form 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Rehabilitation of Prospective Memory 
 
Names of Researchers: Andrew Wood, Fiona Scott and Satu Baylan  
            
Please initial box 
 
1.  I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated    
  25 August 2010 (version 2.1) for the above study.  
 
2.  I have had the opportunity to consider the information provided, ask questions,  
  and had these answered satisfactorily. 
 
3.  I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to withdraw at any 
time, without giving any reason and without my legal rights being affected. 
 
4.  One of the tests require your responses to be recorded using an audio recorder (1-2 
minutes) for scoring purposes. This will be stored anonymously and will not be used for 
any other purpose. I give permission to record my answers. 
 
5.  I agree to make information collected during this study available to related research 
projects at the Section of Psychological Medicine, University of Glasgow. 
 
6.  I give permission for my test scores to be given to my clinical team to help them in 
planning my treatment. 
 
7.  I give permission for my GP to be informed that I am taking part in the current study. 
 
8.  I agree to take part in the above study.   
         
                   
Name of subject  Date  Signature 
 
       
Name of Person taking consent    Date  Signature 
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2.6    Protocol  for  Goal  Management  Training  and  Implementation 
Intention Intervention. (GMT protocol adapted from Levine et al. (2000)).  
 
Before the participant is in the room: 
 
·  Have laptop switched on, with ‘Beep/ buzzer’ mp3 file accessible. 
·  Place a mug behind the participant’s chair 
·  Place participant instructions in front of the seat 
·  Invite participant into the testing room. 
 
Begin treatment protocol. 
 
Regardless of the participant’s grasp of the techniques or performance, encouragement 
should be given following all attempts. Checks should be made to ensure that they 
understand the tasks or instructions. The treatment script will include the steps outlined 
below. At each point turn over the appropriate page and get the participant to read out the 
steps. 
 
 
Stage 1- Goal Management Training 
 
“Thank you for taking part in this study. As it said in your information sheet, the purpose of 
this study is to improve your memory. You will practice techniques that will help you 
remember to do things in the future. 
 
It is often very useful if what we do today relate to your real-life experiences. So when we’re 
doing these things, try to think about how you could use them in everyday life, even if it’s 
just with little things. Some of the things I ask you to do may feel a bit unusual, but they are 
very helpful. I will also ask you to do these things several times. This is a special technique 
that will help you to remember things more easily. 
 
In order to remember to do things, first you need to have a good plan for what it is you 
want to do. People often find planning and solving problems harder 
after a brain injury. When they see a problem, they often charge at it 
full speed without thinking about whether their solution will work! It is 
a bit like a waving a red rag in front of a bull! Can you think of a time 
you’ve charged straight in? 
 
They can also find it more difficult coming up with a solution that 
works. So we’ll start by finding ways to come up with good solutions 
to problems. 
 
When you’re faced with a problem the first thing you need to do is “STOP”. Finding a 
solution isn’t a race. Take your time. Some people might say, “Wait a minute” or “hold on”  
115 
 
to themselves. You can come up with your own if you like. What would you say to bring 
yourself to a halt? 
·  STOP! 
 
After you've stopped, you need to decide what it is you'd like to happen. You need to work 
out your goal or target.  
 
For example, if someone asked you to 'take the rubbish out', what 
would this mean. How would you know that you'd successfully 'taken 
the rubbish out'? What would it look like? Try to picture it in your 
mind. Think about the way it would look if it were done properly. 
 
Give them time to think. Present the corresponding participant sheet. 
 
·  STOP! 
·  Ask yourself, “What is my goal”? 
 
Next you need to describe in detail what your goal will look like if you achieve it. In my 
example, it would be that I could imagine a tied up bin bag sitting in the rubbish collection 
area. Can you think about that?  
 
Give them time to think. Present the corresponding participant sheet. 
 
·  STOP! 
·  Ask yourself, “What is my goal”? 
·  What will my goal look like if I have achieved it? 
 
 
However, to achieve a goal we need to list the steps we have to take to get there. So to take 
out the rubbish, I'd first get out new bin liner. Then I'd take out the full bag and 
tie it. Next I'd put the clean bin liner in the bin. Finally, I'd take the bin bag 
outside to the collection area. 
Everyone’s steps will be different, but think about how you’d do it? 
 
Give them time to think. Present the corresponding participant sheet. 
 
·  STOP! 
·  Ask yourself, “What is my goal”? 
·  What will my goal look like if I have achieved it? 
·  Break it down into smaller steps 
 
 
To make sure you remember what it is you're going to do, it helps to learn the steps. Try 
picturing them in your mind. If you can't picture yourself going from start to finish in one 
steady stream, you may have missed out a step. Go over them several times until you're 
happy that you can remember them.  
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·  STOP! 
·  Ask yourself, “What is my goal”? 
·  What will my goal look like if I have achieved it? 
·  Break it down into smaller steps 
·  Learn the steps 
 
 
Get the participant to repeat the list with it in front of them. 
 
“Now let’s practice this. If somebody said to you “Can you make me some tea?” how would 
you do that using these skills? Talk me through it”. [Scaffold the participant’s attempts, with 
the minimum amount of assistance possible]. 
 
 
Stage 2- Implementation Intentions 
 
“We’ve now looked at ways of planning more effectively. This is an important part of 
remembering things. Now, we’re going to look at ways of helping you to remember to do 
things. Research has shown that it can be very useful to use your imagination when trying to 
remember things. It has also shown that speaking things out loud can also be very helpful. I 
am going to ask you to practice some techniques. Some of them can feel a bit unusual, but 
they’re very useful. 
 
(1) 
“First, I’d like you to think of a time when you forgot to do something. Can you tell me your 
example? [If the participant can’t think of an example, prompt with ‘forgetting your 
medication’, ‘forgetting to meet a friend’ or ‘forgetting to post something important’].” 
 
·  Can you tell me what happened in a bit more detail? 
·  What were you meant to do? 
·  What happened because you forgot? 
·  Did forgetting have a good or a bad outcome? 
·  Would you want that to happen again? 
 
“Often there is a sign, cue or trigger to let you know that you have to do something. 
Sometimes this sign is a thing, sometime it’s a behaviour or action, other times it’s inside 
our heads. So, for example, if I said to you “after this session is over, can you put the chairs 
away”, the cue might be you getting up from your seat, opening the door to leave, or seeing 
that 1 hour has passed. Its up to you what it is, but it has to happen at the right time for you 
to complete the task. 
 
“This means that whenever you are trying to remember to do something, you first thing you 
need to work out the cue-to-act. To do this, you must plan what you need to do. You’ve 
worked on this already. If you have to do something in the future, you need to work if there  
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is a prompt or cue letting you know when to act. And if there is, what it is. So starting from 
the beginning, when you realize there there’s something you need to do later on: 
 
·  STOP! 
·  Ask yourself, “What is my goal”? 
·  What will my goal look like if I have achieved it? 
·  Break it down into smaller steps 
·  Learn the steps 
·  What’s my cue (It can be a smell, a sound, an event, a  
    specific time or gap)? 
 
“So in your example, what do you think might have been the cue? [Work through this 
example with the participant] 
 
Questions for elaboration: How did you know it was time to take it? What made you think 
that? What might have happened at the same time?  
 
(2) 
“The next thing is to imagine what you’ll do when you hear the prompt or cue. Picture the 
scene in your head. Imagine all the things going on around you. Picture the cue very clearly. 
Pull in all five of your senses. Imagine the cue happening and you acting straight away. Go 
from start to finish. Imagine noticing the cue and go all the way through to you completing 
the task you’re meant to do. Do it a couple of times to be sure you’ve got it. So, for example, 
if you thought to yourself, “when I get home, I will need to call my friend”, you might 
imagine yourself walking in the door of your home, walking over to the telephone, and 
calling her straight away. 
 
So starting from the beginning, in your example: 
 
·  STOP! 
·  Ask yourself, “What is my goal? 
·  What will my goal look like if I have achieved it? 
·  Break it down into smaller steps 
·  Learn the steps 
·  Work out your cue (It can be a smell, a sound, an event, an action, a 
specific  
  time)? 
·  Imagine the cue happening, and you acting straight away. Make it 
very clear. 
 
(3) 
Once you done this, play with the image. Imagine the cue you’ve picked. Make it bigger and 
more noticeable. If it’s a sound, make it louder. If it’s an object, make it bigger. If it’s a smell 
or sensation, make it stronger. If it’s an action, make it exaggerated. Make your cue very 
clear in your mind. Think about the other things that will be going on around you at that. 
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“If you need to watch out for a special time, imagine hearing anything to do with ‘time’, 
clocks or watches and acting straight away. Is there anything that will happen at that special 
time? Imagine a clock or a watch. What will it look like when it’s time to act? What time will 
it tell? How often will you need to check it? Imagine yourself checking the clock or watch 
regularly. 
 
So in your example… 
 
So starting from the beginning, in your example: 
·  STOP! 
·  Ask yourself, “What is my goal? 
·  What will my goal look like if I have achieved it? 
·  Break it down into smaller steps 
·  Learn the steps 
·  Work out your cue (It can be a smell, a sound, an event, a   
    specific time or gap)? 
·  Imagine the cue happening, and you acting straight away.  Make it 
very clear. 
·  Play with the cue. Make it more noticeable. 
  
(4) 
After that, say what you’re going to do out loud. Saying your intention out loud may feel a 
bit strange. But it means that if you go to the trouble of saying 
something out loud, it shows that you’ve really thought about it.  
 
“For example, “when I see/hear/smell/do [whatever]… I will…” 
 
So starting from the beginning, in your example: 
 
·  STOP! 
·  Ask yourself, “What is my goal? 
·  What will my goal look like if I have achieved it? 
·  Break it down into smaller steps 
·  Learn the steps 
·  Work out your cue (It can be a smell, a sound, an event, a  
    specific time or gap)? 
·  Picture the cue happening, and you acting straight away.   Make it 
very clear. 
·  Play with the cue. Make it more noticeable 
·  Say out loud, “when I notice the cue, I will do …” 
 
 [This stage again uses errorless learning. Ask the participant to read out the bullet points.] 
 
Stage 3- Practice 
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[Ask if they have any questions, and correct any misunderstanding about the techniques] 
 
“That might seem like a lot. But, soon you’ll see how naturally and easily it comes. Let’s 
practice.  
 
The practice examples include a mixture of direct and indirect directions. Use heavy 
intonation to indicate the relevant requests. Leave longer-than-usual gaps if necessary. If 
they don’t pick up hints, explicitly describe the tasks. 
 
Direct requests and well-structured problems: 
 
·  “As you’re looking through these drawings, when you see the card with a cat on it, 
tell me the colour of its coat”. 
“Tell me how you’d use your skills to remember to do this”. 
 
Support them in this first exercise, but try to provide the minimal amount required for 
success. Provide significant encouragement regardless of performance. 
 
“Let’s try a new one” 
·  “When you finish here today, if the light in the hallway is off, switch it on.” 
“Tell me how you’d use your skills to remember to do this.” 
 
Indirect requests and ill-structured problems: 
 
“Let’s try a new one” 
·  “The chairs need to be put away once the test is over”. 
“Tell me how you’d use your skills to remember to do this”. 
 
“Let’s try a new one” 
·  “The receptionist wanted the clock back when we finish”. 
“Tell me how you’d use your skills to remember to do this”. 
 
However sometimes you may need to more than one thing at a time. Sometimes you may 
just need to stop and work out the steps. Other tasks will mean you need to find a cue. 
Sometimes you might need to do both. It is up to you to work out if there’s a cue that 
needs to be noticed. If you start by working out the steps, you can then work out whether 
there you need to find a cue. Do it one step at a time. 
 
So, see if you can work it out in this task: 
 
“I want you to sort these playing cards for me according to colour. But while you’re doing 
that, when you hear the sound of the buzzer, I want you to tell me the name of an 
animal”. Play the sound of the bell, and then say, “Talk me through the process. Tell me 
what you’d do, and how you’d do it”. Support them in this first exercise, but try to provide 
the minimal amount required for success. Provide significant encouragement regardless of 
performance.  
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Okay, let’s practice these skills for real. You’re not getting tested on this. It’s just a chance 
to try out what you’ve learned. You don’t need to tell me what you’d do, just use the 
techniques. 
 
[The task itself will ask participants to circle capital letters and to put a line through names 
in a large bit of text. These instructions will be left in front of them throughout the test. The 
task will last between 4-6 minutes]. 
 
I have a couple of things I’d like you to try (place the tasks in front of the participants, but 
remove after training). On this bit of paper, I’d like you to circle the capital letters and put 
a line through the names. However, while you’re doing this: 
 
·  When you hear the sound of the buzzer (play sound of buzzer), can you stop what 
you’re doing, pick up the mug behind you and give it to me? 
·  Every 2 minutes, can you tell me the name of a different film, TV or radio 
programme? 
 
Can you tell me what I’ve asked you to do? 
 
Tell me when you’re ready to start. 
 
Place the clock on the table in front of them. Have the buzzer sound file available.  
 
After the task has finished: 
 
That’s great work. Now you’ve practised these skills, I’d like you to use them in the next 
assessment measures you do after your break. Think about how you’d use them in the 
computer task we did earlier. 
 
Give the participant the final sheet to consider over the break.  
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2.7    Protocol for Placebo Intervention  
[Placebo intervention included identical Goal Management Training component and 
practice session to that of the experimental intervention in Chapter 2.5] 
Stage 2- Placebo 
 
We’ve looked at ways of planning more effectively. Now, we’re going to look at ways to help 
you remember to do things in the future. Research has shown that it can be very useful to 
use your imagination when trying to remember things. It has also shown that speaking 
things out loud can also be very helpful. I am going to get you to practice some techniques. 
As I said earlier, some of them can feel a bit strange, but they’re very useful. 
 
There are a few parts to this. We’re going to use something called Neural Spreading 
Activation to use images to improve your memory. This works by creating connections 
between things that are important in your life, and the things you want to remember to do 
during the day. This process produces superior learning because it allows you to use several 
methods of encoding (such as emotional responses and imagery) to assist your memory. 
First, picture someone you know well and have strong positive feelings towards (select). The 
better you know the person, the more parts of your life they will connect to. Think about 
their face in detail. Make their face bigger and bigger; more and more detailed (enlarge). 
Take the first letter of the cue that you have chosen. Try using some feature or combination 
of features in the person’s face to form the first letter of the cue. For example, if the cue 
begins with the letter L (for light), then a ‘L’ might be traced using a line running along the 
eyebrows, curving around the eyes to the eyes to the tip of the nose, from there, round the 
corner of the mouth, and back towards their chin. 
 
[Place the treatment script in front of the participant. If the participant asks ‘what is a cue’, 
give a time-based PM example (e.g. going to the doctors at 5 o’clock- “5 would be your cue”. 
Then state that it will become clearer with practice.) Present the picture of the experimenter 
with an ‘5’ superimposed on it] 
So… 
·  STOP! 
·  Ask yourself, “What is my goal? 
·  Break it down into smaller steps 
·  Learn the steps 
·  Work out your cue 
·  Use your imagination to trace the first letter of the cue on a friend’s 
face 
 
Now you know what you’re trying to do, and how you’re going to do it. Picture the person’s 
face very clearly. Imagine their face getting bigger and clearer. Take the first letter of the 
cue. Make it very clear in your mind. Make the letter very distinctive. Use the person’s facial 
features to trace the letter. Use their eyes, eyebrows, mouth, nose, hair. Do it a couple of 
times to be sure you’ve got it. 
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[This stage again uses errorless learning. Ask the participant to write the word down on a 
small bit of paper as they’re read out]. 
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2.8    Major Research Project- Proposal 
 
Title: Rehabilitation of Executive function deficits following Acquired Brain Injury: using Goal 
Management Training and Implementation Intentions to improve Prospective Memory. 
 
Abstract: Background: Deficits in executive function (e.g. planning, problem-solving, 
prospective memory) following brain injury are associated with significant negative social 
and occupational outcomes. Prospective memory (PM) is particularly susceptible to the 
effects of brain injury, as it relies on controlled attentional resources to establish and recall 
intentions. Implementation intentions (II) have been shown to improve performance on 
prospective memory tasks across a variety of durations, by circumventing controlled 
attention and establishing strong cue-action associations using imagery and declarative 
statements. 
Aims: To determine the efficacy of a theory-based training intervention for prospective 
memory deficits following acquired brain injury. 
Methods: A single blind, randomised trial will be used to assess the efficacy of 
implementation intentions for individuals with acquired brain injury. A within-between 
mixed design will be used to assess pre/ post intervention changes between two groups 
receiving either implementation intentions or a placebo interventions. Participants will be 
assessed using traditional and ecologically valid measures of executive function. 
Applications: This study aims to increase the number of evidence-based interventions for 
deficits in executive function by demonstrating the efficacy of implementation intentions in 
a brain injury population. 
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Introduction 
 
Executive function refers to the higher-order processing of internally- and externally-
generated stimuli (Burgess et al., 2007), and includes abilities such as planning, concept 
formation, impulse control, metacognition and self-monitoring. Deficits in executive 
function have been associated with significant impairment in everyday functioning, leading 
to poor vocational and social outcomes (Mazauk et al., 1997). Executive deficits have 
historically been conceptualised as a largely homogenous syndrome, such as ‘frontal lobe 
syndrome’, and most recently ‘dysexecutive syndrome’ (Burgess et al., 2006). However, 
recent investigations have questioned the validity of this syndromal perspective (e.g. Stuss 
& Alexander, 2007), with more comprehensive models acknowledging the separation of 
function within a broader attentional system. 
 
In their influential model of executive function, Shallice & Burgess (1996) delineate the 
processes involved in the executive system used for complex everyday tasks. They propose 
that in response to a given situation, individuals construct temporary new schemas 
(behavioural templates or protocols used to achieve a goal). This can occur spontaneously, 
or through a process of problem solving (an iterative cycle involving problem formation, 
deepening of the solving attempt, and establishment of a ‘success criteria’ against which 
later solution attempts are compared). Once developed, schema are implemented in 
accordance with ‘contention scheduling’ (the process of choosing between well-established 
action sequences and thought processes; Burgess et al., 2007). However, to function 
efficiently in real-world tasks, two special purpose processes are used: Firstly, to reduce the 
cognitive load associated with constructing new schema, an episodic/ autobiographical 
memory system is used to provide similar experiences when confronted with novel 
situations and problems. Secondly, where schema are not to be implemented immediately, 
a prospective memory (PM) component assists in creating and realizing the schema later. 
 
This prospective memory component appears to be particularly susceptible to the effects of 
brain injury, with deficits frequently appearing following injury (e.g. Shum, Valentine & 
Cutmore, 1999). Failures in prospective memory are both familiar and important, as they  
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range from the benign but irritating (forgetting to post a letter or meet a friend), to the 
potentially disastrous (leaving pots burning on the stove). Shallice & Burgess (1991) argue 
that having identified a ‘to-be-remembered’ task, a person creates an ‘intention marker’, a 
neural trigger represented within a three-dimensional cognitive space. When a person’s 
conscious attention encounters an intention marker, it brings the intention into awareness 
and inhibits current ongoing activity.  
It is argued that failure in prospective memory is frequently a result of ‘goal neglect’ 
(Duncan, 1996) or ‘strategy application disorder’ (Shallice & Burgess, 1991). While these two 
deficits give rise to subtly differing patterns of behaviour, they both result in the failure to 
carry out appropriate activities given a relevant intentional cue. Importantly, this is in spite 
of accurate verbal recall of the intention to be carried out. 
 
There are two forms of prospective memory tasks: time-based (remembering to do 
something at a particular time e.g. cooking, meeting a friend), and event-based 
(remembering to do something on the occurrence of a specific prompt). It has been argued 
that time-based prospective tasks provoke a considerably greater cognitive load than event-
based remembering, particularly given the absence of environmental cues to provoke recall 
(Einstein et al., 2005, Kvavilashvili & Fisher, 2007). Factors that have been shown to 
influence event-based recall include cue salience, relevance, the propositional structure of 
intentions and the strength of cue-intention association (e.g. McDaniel & Einstein, 2000; 
McDaniel et al., 2007). 
 
Explanations for time-based prospective memory have received significantly less attention 
(Kvalilashvili & Fisher, 2007), with the competing models being the test-wait-test-exit model 
(TWTE) and random-walk models (Harris & Wilkins, 1982; Wilkins 1979). TWTE argues that 
successful performance is dependant on monitoring of the time, possibly using an internal 
clock, accompanied by occasional checks that increase in a J-shaped curve towards the 
target time. Alternatively, according to the random-walk model of prospective memory, the 
intention sits within a multidimensional representation of consciousness, triggered only 
when the person’s attention accidentally stumbles upon it or closely related concepts within  
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the internal or external environment (e.g. events or concepts relating to time). As compared 
to the TWTE model, the random-walk model implies that few- if any- attentional resources 
are required to trigger a time-based intention. 
A number of interventions have attempted to rehabilitate deficits in prospective memory; 
however, in considering them, an important distinction must be made between 
rehabilitation approaches aiming to compensate for deficits (by providing neurological 
and/or environmental support for a deficit), or those that seek to ameliorate deficits 
through training (Evans, 2006). Manly et al. (2002) and Fish et al. (2007) adopt the former 
approach, using intermittent prompts to cue prospective memory tasks in patients with 
traumatic brain injury. They found that even when prompts were semi-random, and were 
non-contingent with the cue, they nonetheless produced significant improvements in 
performance compared with controls. Manly et al. (2002) argue that the prompt provides 
external support for intentional markers that are competing for expression, orienting 
attention away from the immediate task. This explanation is consistent with Burgess et al. 
(2007) ‘gateway hypothesis’ of attentional control, which argues that aspects of Brodmann 
Area 10 (lateral and medial rostral) are responsible for mediating between stimulus-
oriented and stimulus-independent cognition; essentially switching between the outside 
environment and one’s internal goals. 
 
Remedial or skills-based interventions for PM deficits can be divided into those looking at 
Goal Management Training (Robertson et al., 1996) and Implementation Intentions 
(Gollwitzer, 1999). Levine et al. (2000) randomised participants with brain injury to either 
Goal Management Training (GMT) or Motor Skills Training (MST), and assessed their 
performance on proof reading task (participants were to circle numbers, underline fruits 
and vegetables, and put an ‘X’ through liquids). They found that those assigned to GMT 
were significantly more accurate and slower than the MST group, taken to indicate greater 
care and attention to the task in hand. However, other studies have provided equivocal 
support for the use of GMT in prospective memory. Brown & Evans (in preparation) 
assessed PM performance on a virtual reality task following brief GMT training and auditory 
alerts, with the treatment group showing improvement on a measure of event-based PM.  
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There was no overall improvement on other measures of time- and event-based PM 
(although this may be due to ceiling effects on the task performance). 
 
However, there are important qualitative differences between the tasks used in these 
studies, and these null findings may reflect incompatibility between GMT and specific PM 
tasks. For example, the proof-reading task used by Levine et al. (2000) is a highly structured 
PM task, akin to those used in experimental investigations of PM. It is possible that given a 
task where an individual is engaged in spotting stimuli (with few- if any- distractions), the 
intention remains in conscious attention throughout. However, when an intention is to be 
activated while the individual simultaneously performs other demanding tasks (e.g. Brown & 
Evans, in preparation), GMT may not in itself provide sufficient assistance, even with 
auditory alerts to remind them of their training. Nonetheless, GMT is likely to be a critical 
part in the process, as it supports the development of clear planning. 
 
In contrast, implementation intentions (II) are explicit statements about their intentions 
when they see a particular cue (e.g. ‘when I see X, I will do Y’), and includes the use of 
imagery to create a rich mental representation of possible stimuli that may occur with the 
cue. Implementation intentions are believed to work, not only because they establish a 
strong, cue-response association, but also because they circumvent the need for controlled 
attention to realize the intention. Importantly, II have been shown to be effective in both 
event- and time-based PM tasks. For example, Prestwich et al. (2005) used II to promote 
breast self-examination, and found that a statement of the specific intention and 
commitment to self-examining in the next month was found to increase both the likelihood 
and frequency of self-examination at one- and six-month follow-up. Similarly, Liu & Park 
(2004) looked at the effect of II on accuracy of blood glucose checking in older adults, and 
found that those using II performed tests nearly 50% more often than controls over a period 
of three weeks. This study also suggests that II may work even where there are no inherent 
motivators, as none of the participants had diabetes. 
 
Using a neurologically impaired sample, Kardiasmenos et al. (2008) allocated patients with 
Multiple Sclerosis to II and control conditions, following which they were then tested on a  
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board game meant to simulate prospective memory in everyday life. They found a 
significant difference between the MS intervention and control groups, with the 
intervention group showing a greater proportion of correct event-based PM responses in 
the task. Lengfelder & Gollwitzer (2001) found that II had a significant effect in improving 
dual-tasking performance in those with frontal brain injury. However, the practical 
implications of this study are unclear, as the authors did not explore the impact of II on 
functional or ecologically valid measures. 
Consequently, there is a need to explore the impact which II have on PM performance in 
those with brain injury. The present study will explore the impact of implementation 
intentions in the context of Shallice & Burgess’ (1991) model of realisation of intentions: 
that for intention formation and realization, there must be adequate problem solving. 
Therefore, all participants will receive GMT; however, only half will receive an 
implementation intention intervention. 
Aims and hypotheses: 
 
This study aims to: 
·  Determine the efficacy of a theory-based training intervention for prospective 
memory. 
·  Establish whether individual profiles of deficits predict the improvement obtained 
from a particular intervention. 
·  Explore predicted dissociations in response to the intervention according to the 
deficits identified by the baseline assessment measures. 
 
Hypotheses 
1.  Participants receiving combined GMT and implementation intention training 
will perform significantly better on measures of prospective memory and 
executive function than those allocated to combined GMT and placebo 
intervention.  
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2.  Those participants with the greatest deficits in PM at baseline will derive 
significantly greater benefit from the II intervention than those with better 
performance at initial testing. 
 
Plan of Investigation 
 
Participants 
Twenty-six participants with acquired brain injury (ABI) with reports self- and/or carer 
reports of executive function deficits will be recruited. Carers will be used to complete proxy 
measures of questionnaires. Their completed questionnaires will be used to characterise the 
brain injured sample; they will not be recruited to the study as experimental participants 
nor are they control subjects. Their consent will be implicit if questionnaires are returned 
completed. 
 
 
Inclusion Criteria 
Brain-injured participants between the ages of 18 and 65 and reported deficits in executive 
function from self and/or carers will be included. 
 
Exclusion criteria 
Individuals with premorbid learning disability, concurrent severe mental illness, currently 
abusing drugs or alcohol, or with degenerative neurological disorders will be excluded. 
Factors such as severe dyslexia and visual impairments, and inability to provide informed 
consent (e.g. Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) 2000 Act) will also merit exclusion. Those 
with severe unawareness of deficits will also be excluded. 
 
Recruitment procedures 
Participants will be recruited from NHS services, such as Community Treatment Centre; 
Neuropsychology departments and Stroke services in Glasgow and Ayrshire & Arran. Further 
recruitment will also occur from organisations such as Headway (Dumbarton and Ayrshire &  
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Arran), Momentum, and Graham Anderson House, Springburn. Clinical judgement will be 
used to assess suitability and capacity. 
 
Measures 
The following baseline neuropsychological measures will be used to characterise the 
sample: 
·  Adapted Dysexecutive Questionnaire [carer version] (DEX; Chaytor et al., 2006) 
which assesses general dysexecutive symptoms, as well as coping behaviours. 
·  Prospective and Retrospective Memory Questionnaire [patient and carer versions] 
(PRMQ; Crawford et al., 2003; 2006). 
·  Wechsler Test of Adult Reading (WTAR; The Psychological Corporation, 2001) as a 
measure of premorbid intellectual functioning. 
·  Rey Complex Figure Test (Immediate and Delayed) (Meyers & Meyers, 1985) as a 
measure of visual memory. 
·  Logical memory (Immediate and Delayed) subtests of Wechsler Memory Scale 
(WMS-III) as a measure of verbal memory. 
·  Symbol-digit Modalities Test (Smith, 1968) as a measure of processing speed. 
·  Matrix Reasoning subtest from Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-III; Wechsler, 
1997) as a measure of non-verbal or fluid intelligence. 
·  Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS; Zigmond & Snaith, 1989). 
·  Tower Test (D-KEFS, Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System; Delis, Kaplan & Kramer, 
2001), as a ‘traditional’ measure of executive function.  
·  Trail Making Test (Reitan 1958) as a measure of set shifting. 
·  Cambridge Prospective Memory Test (CAMPROMPT; Wilson et al., 2005). 
·  Modified Hotel Test as an ecologically valid measure of executive function. 
·  Computerized tasks with and without prospective remembering demand. 
 
A measure of Socio-economic status will be determined using the Scottish Index of Multiple 
Deprivation (SIMD) system based on the participants’ postcode. 
 
Primary outcome measures  
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·  JAAM Virtual Reality test (Jansari, Agnew, Akesson & Murphy, 2004) will be used pre- 
and post- intervention. The JAAM is a computer-based task which requires 
participants to complete PM tasks, such as responding to memos, within a virtual 
office environment. Participants receive separate scores for planning and PM 
components, which contribute to a total measure of executive function.  
·  Removals Task (Third Dimension, 2005) will be used post-intervention to assess for 
generalisation of strategies. This is a computer-based task which requires 
participants to remove items of furniture from a house, while completing certain PM 
tasks (e.g. remembering to close doors, checking the front door after a set period). 
Due to ceiling effects observed in Brown & Evans (submitted) a modified version 
with an auditory monitoring task will be used. 
 
Design 
 
A 2x2 mixed prospective design will be used. The between-subjects variable will be 
intervention (GMT+ Implementation Intentions vs. GMT+ Placebo imagery intervention), and 
the within-subjects variable time (baseline and post-treatment). Participants will be 
randomised to one of two groups using a true random number generator (e.g. random.org; 
Haahr, 2010) immediately before the second testing session. This is a single-blind 
randomised trial; participants will be blind to treatment allocation, however experimenters 
will not be blind to treatment or assessment allocation. 
 
Research Procedures 
Participants will undergo the all of the above assessment measures (except the Removals 
Task) over two testing sessions. Assessment may be undertaken either as part of 
involvement in a linked study (“Assessment of Everyday Executive Functioning in Individuals 
with Acquired Brain Injury”) or as part of the present study. Each session will last a 
maximum of 2 hours. Those participants who are shown to have significant problems in 
prospective memory will be recruited to the intervention session. The intervention session 
will entail undergoing a treatment (experimental or placebo) followed by testing on the  
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JAAM and Removals task computer tests. This session will last between 2 and 2 ½ hours. 
Some adaptations may be made for participants with physical disabilities. Given the nature 
of their deficits, participants will receive letters detailing their appointment times. They will 
also receive a telephone or email reminder 24 hours prior these appointments. Participants 
will be invited to an NHS or voluntary organisation location for testing and intervention. 
Recruitment to the study will occur by two routes. 
 
(1) Participants may be recruited from a study running concurrently (Title: “Assessment of 
Everyday Executive Functioning in Individuals with Acquired Brain Injury”). This study uses 
identical assessment measures and methods to the present study (as described above). If 
participants demonstrate significant impairment with prospective memory following 
assessment in that study, they will be recruited to the present study at Point B in flowchart 
and would sign Consent Form B. Participants will already have signed a consent form with 
identical content to Consent Form A and would have received Participant Information 
Sheets A & B. Data from that study will be used for the present study. Participants will not 
repeat the assessment measures undertaken in the initial two assessment sessions. They 
will undertake an intervention, and be tested on the JAAM and Removals task computer 
tests. 
(2) Should that study meet its sample size before the present study is completed, then 
participants will be recruited from clinician referral (point A in the flowchart) and would sign 
Consent Form A and B. This will involve all assessment measures described above, in 
addition to the potential involvement in the intervention and post-treatment assessments. 
Those recruited by either route will receive Participant Information Sheets detailing the 
nature of both the assessment and intervention phases of the study. In either case they will 
sign Consent Form B. The attached flowchart details the full procedure. 
 
Intervention 
Consistent with Shallice & Burgess (1991) hypothesis of ‘strategy application disorder’, brief 
Goal Management Training will be undertaken initially with all participants to assist with the  
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ability to form intentions. This involves using a Stopping, Setting a Goal, Listing the Steps, 
and Learning the Steps, before continuing. 
 
The experimental intervention will focus on the specific components influencing the 
successful recall of prospective cues: (1) Intention formation- this includes the use of 
imagery and errorless learning strategies to learn associations between target cues and 
desired actions. For example, visualising themselves immediately performing the action 
when they see the cue; (2) Event-based PM recall strategies. For example, manipulating the 
salience of the cue in terms of size, appearance and volume; (3) Time-based PM recall 
strategies. For example, using imagery to increase associations between cues and time-
based objects and concepts (see Appendix 1 for a detailed description). To assist with 
generalisation, a variety of training tasks will be used, from well- to poorly-structured 
delayed intention problems. 
 
The placebo intervention will faithfully employ GMT terminology and techniques, but will 
adopt a non-specific imagery training exercise used by Evans et al. (2006). This will involve 
using imagery to draw the first letter of the cue onto the face of a person that they know 
well. While this is found to improve name recall, it is not expected to improve intention 
realisation (see Appendix 2). 
 
 
Justification of Sample size 
 
GPower (v 3.1.2) (Faul et al., 2009) was used to calculate sample size. It is estimated that to 
detect a large effect size (Cohen’s f
2=0.35), with α= 0.05, on the interaction of a within-
between ANOVA, 20 participants with deficits in prospective memory will be required. This 
estimate is based on the finding of Kardiasmenos et al. (2008) who used a neurologically-
impaired sample, adopted a implementation intention intervention and used a functionally-
relevant outcome measure of PM, achieving a large effect size (η
2= 0.227). However, as the 
present study uses a less directive training than Kardiasmenos et al., a more conservative 
sample estimate is appropriate should the obtained effect size be smaller. A sample of 26  
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participants will reduce the probability of the study being underpowered, and remains 
practical in the given timeframe. 
 
Settings and Equipment 
Where possible the participant will be tested in the base of the organisation from which 
they were recruited. In the absence of such premises, individuals will be tested in the 
Community Brain Injury Treatment Centre, Govan. Equipment required includes encrypted 
NHS laptops, software for VR programmes, neuropsychological assessments and record 
forms, and psychometric questionnaires (see appendix 3). 
 
Data Analysis 
2x2 mixed ANOVA will be applied to the data. Post hoc comparison in performance will be 
used to explore differential patterns of performance according to a predefined assessment 
profile of deficits. 
 
Health and Safety Issues 
Issues pertain to the use of participants who are (in varying degrees) impulsive, display 
irrational or unpredictable behaviour, and/or have poor emotional control. Clear guidelines 
on acceptable behaviour and conditions under which testing will be terminated will be 
devised. Testing will only occur in locations that have been risk assessed. Individuals who 
are intoxicated will be excluded from testing. Risks to participants include the use of a novel 
intervention, and stress associated with significant assessment. The use of blinding also risks 
introducing in participants a sense of failure or having been deceived. These are explored in 
detail in the appendices, although full debriefing will occur following the completion of 
testing. All participants will be informed in advance of the blinding and possibility of 
deception. 
 
Ethical issues 
Ethical issues relate to the use of vulnerable patient groups and application of a novel 
intervention within a research context. Blinding participants to their treatment allocation  
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also introducing ethical issues regarding potential deception of vulnerable individuals. 
Participants will have the opportunity to withdraw without any prejudice to their care. Due 
to NHS GG&C directives, encrypted laptops may be required to store and run datasets. 
Applications will be made for Site Specific approval, as participants may recruited for NHS 
GG&C and NHS Ayrshire & Arran. 
 
Financial Issues 
Sufficient funding will be necessary to cover the cost of record forms and questionnaires. 
Participants will not receive financial remuneration for participating. Details of expenses are 
included in the appendices (see Appendix 3). 
. 
Timetable 
We aim to apply for ethical approval in September 2010 and to begin recruitment and 
investigation in autumn 2010 (see Appendix 4) 
 
Practical Applications 
 
This study aims to increase the number of evidence-based interventions for deficits in 
executive function by demonstrating the efficacy of implementation intentions in a brain 
injury population. Furthermore, it aims to provide further evidence of the separability of 
executive functions. 
 
References 
 
References can be found in Chapter 2 (Major Research Project). 
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2.9    Financial Costs 
 
Item  No. required  Approximate Cost 
 
Questionnaires 
 
   
Adapted DEX Questionnaires (carer & 
client) 
40   Create own (2 sheets x 80 x £0.05 = £8.00) 
PRMQ Questionnaire: client  40  Free to photocopy (£0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
PRMQ Questionnaire: carer  40  Free to photocopy (£0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
HADS Questionnaire   40  Free to photocopy (£0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
Formal Recording Forms 
 
   
Symbol Digit Modalities Test¹  40  2 x pack of 25 (2 x £49.00 = £98.00) 
 
CAMPROMPT Record Forms¹  40  2 x pack of 25 (2 x £49.94 = £99.88) 
Constructed Recording Forms 
 
   
WTAR Record Forms  40  Create own (P/C £0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
Matrix Reasoning subtest (WAIS-III)  40  Create own (P/C £0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
Modified six element test (BADS)  40  Create own (P/C £0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
Logical Memory subtest (WMS-III)  40  Create own (P/C £0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
Rey Complex Figure Test  40  Create own (P/C £0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
Tower-Test (D-KEFS)  40  Create own (P/C £0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
Demographic recording sheets & 
Computer Familiarity 
40  Create own (P/C £0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
JAAM Scoring Sheet  40 (3 sheets)  Photocopying (£0.05 x 40 x 3 = £6.00) 
JAAM Materials 
 
   
Re-usable documents  7 sheets  Printing (covered by paper costs) 
Used task-specific documents  6 sheets x 40  Photocopying (£0.05 x 40 x 6 = £12.00) 
Information Packs 
 
   
Printed Material  3 sheets x 60  Photocopying (£0.05 x 60 x 3 = £9.00) 
Headed Paper  60 sheets  Printing (£0.16 x 60 = £9.60) 
Envelopes (size C4)  60  3 x pack of 20 (3 x £1.30 = £3.90) 
White Paper (500 sheets A4)  1 ream   £2.00 
Consent Forms  40  Create own (P/C £0.05 x 40 = £2.00) 
TOTAL COST    £270.38 
 
This cost will be divided evenly between two experimenters.  
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3.0    Research Timetable 
 
Date  MRP Progress/Tasks 
 
April 2010 
 
MRP Proposal submitted 
Costing form submission 
Completion of health and safety form 
 
May – September 2010  MRP research supervision agreement 
Start research logbook 
Ethics approval 
Research & Development approval 
Site preparation 
Ordering materials and administration supplies 
 
October 2010  Research Progress Meeting 1 
 
October – December 2010  Start data collection 
 
January – March 2011  Complete data collection 
Research Progress Meeting 2 
 
April – May 2011  Complete data analyses 
Research Progress Meeting 3 
 
June – July 2011  Submit drafts to supervisor 
 
July 2011  Loose bind and submit 
 
August 2011  Viva preparation 
 
September 2011  Viva 
 
September – November 2011  Submit corrections (if required) 
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3.1    Ethical and Research & Development Approval 
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